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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is fast becoming the most illusive aspect of life for Ameri-
cans. The concept of the American way of life was built upon the right
to be left alone. That right is currently threatened by both govern-
ment and private entities. When it comes to government encroach-
ment upon the right, we look to the Fourth Amendment to regulate
and protect against unreasonable encroachments, and we look to the
Supreme Court to define the Fourth Amendment's terms. For the
past three decades, that Court has applied a cramped definition of
"search," thereby excluding common government investigative tech-
niques from the protection of the Fourth Amendment.1 One such ap-
plication has excluded dog sniffs2 for illegal drugs from the term
"search." With that leeway, police are utilizing dogs much more fre-
quently to detect illegal drugs and in contexts never considered by the
Court when it defined dog sniffs as being outside of the Fourth
Amendment.
In 1983, the Supreme Court exempted dog sniffs from the reasona-
bleness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 3 The Court stated
that the dog sniff of a piece of luggage is not a search subject to the
Fourth Amendment because a dog sniff is a limited intrusion capable
1. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (explaining that a hovering
helicopter used to photograph defendant's backyard did not violate protected pri-
vacy interest); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that a
fixed-wing airplane used to photograph defendant's backyard did not violate pro-
tected privacy interest); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (ex-
plaining that police entry onto fenced and posted field without a warrant does not
intrude on a protected privacy interest even though entry may constitute a tres-
pass); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (holding that a beeper
attached to an automobile to track the driver does not invade a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979) (holding that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed
from that person's home).
2. The word "sniff" connotes a canine sniffing the air and not touching or pawing the
subject. As a result of their olfactory biology, drug dogs do much more than sniff;
they place their snouts on subjects and are prone to paw at them as well. See
Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, Dogs, Form and Function,
Smell, http://www.nhm.orglexhibitions/dogs/formfunction/smell.html (last visited
Dec. 21, 2006). We have elected to retain the word "sniff," because it is the word
Justice O'Connor used in Place and continues to be used by courts.
3. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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only of accurately determining whether or not the luggage contains
contraband. 4 That statement was not central to the case. 5 Although
the luggage had been properly seized based on reasonable suspicion,
the Court held that the extended detention of the piece of luggage was
unreasonable. That the statements pertaining to dog sniffing were
not central to the decision in Place is a fact that has been consistently
ignored by the more than 2,000 cases citing to United States v. Place
for its proposition about dog sniffs. Thus, a case seemingly limited to
determining the limits of a seizure of a suitcase on less than probable
cause has become the cornerstone of the categorical elimination of ju-
dicial oversight of police canine units. Today canine units operate al-
most without any legal controls, expanding a doctrine created only for
luggage to the arbitrary use of dogs on vehicles, homes, and persons at
the unlimited discretion of a police officer.6
The Place doctrine is based on three specific principles attributed
to a dog sniff that render it "sui generis": a dog sniff is a minimal in-
trusion; a dog only sniffs for the presence of contraband; and, by impli-
cation, a dog is highly accurate. 7 In fact, a dog sniff fails on all three
4. Id. at 707.
5. Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Moreover, contrary to the Court's appar-
ent intimation, an answer to the question is not necessary to the decision. For
the purposes of this case, the precise nature of the legitimate investigative activ-
ity is irrelevant. Regardless of the validity of a dog sniff under the Fourth
Amendment, the seizure was too intrusive. The Court has no need to decide the
issue here." (citation omitted)).
6. See Milton Hirsch & David Oscar Markus, Fourth Amendment Forum: Drugs,
Dogs, and Cars: Oh My!, CHAMPION, June 2005, at 48, 48 ("Accordingly, even if
the drug sniff is not characterized as a Fourth Amendment search, 'the sniff
surely broadened the scope of the traffic-violation-related seizure.' Now, dogs
may be employed on our streets as they are employed at the airport." (footnote
omitted)).
7. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("A 'canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog,
however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example,
an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in
which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniffdiscloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells
the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information ob-
tained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the prop-
erty is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. In these respects, the
canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that
is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the
content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude
that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a
trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
2007]
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accounts, rendering the theoretical basis offered by Justice O'Connor
meaningless.
In 2003, the Place doctrine resulted in a raid on a South Carolina
high school in a small community known as Goose Creek. Captured
on surveillance cameras, students were thrown to the ground by police
officers and subjected to dog sniffs led by teams of administrators and
police officers in an unsuccessful effort to root out the school's "drug
problem."8 Twenty years of very limited judicial oversight of canine
units is directly responsible for the violent intrusion of liberty and pri-
vacy in Goose Creek, a practice the Supreme Court has since validated
when dog sniffs are applied to vehicles and homes.
In 2005, the Place doctrine stained the last stronghold of privacy
when the Court summarily and without opinion applied the Place doc-
trine to the home in Florida v. Rabb.9 Without explanation, the Su-
preme Court applied a doctrine intended for impersonal luggage to the
home, the locus of heightened Fourth Amendment protection as reem-
phasized merely four years earlier in Kyllo v. United States with broad
statements such as the following: "'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion."'1 0 Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's summary reversal of Rabb, the Florida
Court of Appeals reconsidered the issue and held its ground, again
upholding the trial court's granting of the motion to suppress the war-
rant based upon the dog sniff of the defendant's home.11 The United
States Supreme Court denied the state's petition for certiorari, letting
the state decision stand seemingly in conflict with the Court's earlier
summary reversal.
The purpose of this Article is to reexamine the analytical reasoning
behind Justice O'Connor's conclusion that a drug dog is "sui generis."
Part II of this Article revisits the Place decision and the case law
which has extended Place. Part III examines the drug dog in terms of
the accuracy of Justice O'Connor's three-prong analysis which served
to place a dog sniff outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Parts
IV, V, and VI examine whether dog sniffs of homes, students, and
8. See School Drug Raid Causes Uproar, MSNBC, Nov.7, 2003, http://www.msnbc.
com/news/990598.asp?Ocu=CB10&cpl=1.
9. 544 U.S. 1028 (2005).
10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562
(2003) ("In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home."); United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("At the risk of belaboring the obvious,
private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation
is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.").
11. State v. Rabb (Rabb 11), 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 665 (2006).
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other persons-subjects historically deserving Fourth Amendment
protection-should follow the Place doctrine. This Article concludes
by suggesting that the Place analysis was based upon a foundation of
sand, and not only should Place not be extended, it should be over-
turned, thereby allowing traditional Fourth Amendment standards to
control the use of drug dogs.12
II. THE LAW
A. United States v. Place
Place involved police at two airports whose "suspicions" were
aroused by the defendant's behavior. When the defendant refused to
consent to Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents searching his suit-
cases at the second airport,13 agents at LaGuardia airport in New
York seized the suitcases and informed the defendant they intended to
obtain a search warrant. However, at the time of the seizure, there
was no basis for probable cause and a warrant could not have been
obtained. The agents removed the suitcases to Kennedy airport where
they were sniffed by a drug-detection dog; the dog alerted positively to
one suitcase and ambiguously to the other. The dog sniff took place on
a Friday afternoon, and the agents held the bags until Monday when a
search warrant was obtained. A search of the suitcase that had tested
positively disclosed a large quantity of powder cocaine.14
First, the Supreme Court upheld the seizure of the suitcases on
reasonable suspicion, extending Terry v. Ohio,15 which had allowed
for a brief seizure of a person for investigative purposes where there
are facts and circumstances (as opposed to inarticulate hunches) giv-
ing rise to reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed or is
about to commit a crime. The purpose of a Terry seizure is to confirm
or dispel the suspicion. Terry also allows a limited pat-down search of
the suspect where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the
12. The authors appreciate that in times of increased national security the use of
dogs trained to sniff for explosives presents a heightened special need which may
justify bypassing ordinary Fourth Amendment procedures. The use of bomb snif-
fing dogs, which is a separate practice from dogs used to sniff for drugs, should be
subject to less stringent requirements due to heightened circumstances. The use
of the drug dog is the exclusive subject of this Article. See United States v. Beale,
674 F.2d 1327, 1331 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Whatever danger drugs may pose to
society, to our knowledge no one has ever hijacked or blown up an airline with
drug-type contraband." (citation omitted)), vacated, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983).
13. He consented to a search of his checked luggage at the first airport, but the law
enforcement officers did not conduct the search because his flight was about to
leave. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
14. Id. at 698-99.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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suspect may be armed.16 The extension in Place allows a seizure on
reasonable suspicion that the suitcase may contain evidence, entirely
divorced from the protection of the police officer which girded the lim-
ited search in Terry.17 Further, the Court held that a brief seizure of
the luggage to subject it to further investigation-here the drug dog-
was permissible under Terry's rationale of allowing a brief detention
to confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the
ninety-minute seizure of the defendant's luggage was too long and
hence unreasonable under the Terry standard.1s
However, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, went beyond
the issues necessary to decide the case, unilaterally issuing a general
16. Id. at 27 ("Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type
of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.
And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances,
due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience." (citations omitted)).
17. See H. Paul Honsinger, Note, Katz and Dogs: Canine Sniff Inspections and the
Fourth Amendment, 44 LA. L. REV. 1093, 1105-06 (1984) ("Even though Terry is
specifically directed to stops of suspicious persons, there is support in the juris-
prudence for extension of the subsearch principles to objects as well. Such an
approach has several salutary effects. Placing sniffs under the regulation of the
fourth amendment allows judicial scrutiny of their reasonableness. Courts could
consider the nature and scope of the sniff, the particularity of the suspicion which
promoted it, the social interest being protected, and the privacy interest being
infringed upon. Courts would then be free to develop guidelines for regulating
this activity, formulated in the laboratory of experience and based on the overrid-
ing requirement of reasonableness."). But see David E. Steinberg, The Original
Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051,
1061 (2004) ("The historical record strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment
was intended only to proscribe physical searches of residences where the search
occurred pursuant to a general warrant, or without any warrant at all.").
18. Place, 462 U.S. at 710 ("Although the 90-minute detention of respondent's lug-
gage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the violation was exacer-
bated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to
which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dis-
possessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if
the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of
respondent's luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by
police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. We
conclude that, under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of respon-
dent's luggage was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently,
the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of his luggage was inadmissi-
ble, and Place's conviction must be reversed. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals, accordingly, is affirmed.").
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approval of the use of drug dogs to sniff out contraband,19 based on
broad and unsupported conclusions:
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation
that the agents intended to pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage,
which was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 0
There was no authority offered for the broad conclusions which
have controlled the law for the past twenty-three years; moreover, the
unsolicited decision of the issue has served to preclude it from ever
being considered fully.
Concurring only in the result, Justices Brennan and Blackmun ar-
gued how unwise it was to decide an issue not properly before the
Court without the benefits of briefs and arguments.2 1 Justice Bren-
19. Id. at 707 ("We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the
contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A 'ca-
nine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummag-
ing through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information
is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of nar-
cotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authori-
ties something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is
limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate
and more intrusive investigative methods." (citation omitted)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Court also suggests today, in a discus-
sion unnecessary to the judgment, that exposure of respondent's luggage to a nar-
cotics detection dog 'did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.' In the District Court, respondent did 'not contest the valid-
ity of sniff searches per se. . . .' The Court of Appeals did not reach or discuss the
issue. It was not briefed or argued in this Court. In short, I agree with Justice
Blackmun that the Court should not address the issue. I also agree with Justice
Blackmun's suggestion, that the issue is more complex than the Court's discus-
sion would lead one to believe. As Justice Stevens suggested in objecting to 'un-
necessarily broad dicta' in United States v. Knotts, the use of electronic detection
techniques that enhance human perception implicates 'especially sensitive con-
cerns.' Obviously, a narcotics detection dog is not an electronic detection device.
Unlike the electronic 'beeper' in Knotts, however, a dog does more than merely
allow the police to do more efficiently what they could do using only their own
senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human per-
ception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an indi-
vidual's privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as sensitive as
those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection devices. I have ex-
pressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches. In Doe [v. Ren-
frow], I suggested that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a different case.
In any event, I would leave the determination of whether dog sniffs of luggage
amount to searches, and the subsidiary question of what standards should govern
20071
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nan, while conceding that a drug dog is not an electronic detection
device, demonstrated that its capabilities posed an even greater
threat.
Unlike the electronic "beeper" in Knotts, however, a dog does more than
merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they could do using only
their own senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to
human perception. The use of dogs, therefore, represents a greater intrusion
into an individual's privacy. Such use implicates concerns that are at least as
sensitive as those implicated by the use of certain electronic detection
devices.2 2
The Court has never since forthrightly addressed the issue of the
nature of technology that the drug dog represents. In fact, the Court
has repeatedly and rather ambiguously denied certiorari or failed to
write an opinion when faced with cases which would force the Court to
finally decide whether dogs should be considered technology and their
proper role under the Fourth Amendment. 23 The fact that the lower
courts have been left with such limited direction from the Supreme
Court indicates the Justices themselves may be unable to answer the
important question, instead choosing to allow lower courts to decide
on their own.
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for its "haste to resolve
the dog-sniff issue."24 It is difficult to understand the Court's eager-
ness to decide the issue without the benefit of having the issue for-
mally briefed and argued. The year was 1983 and the war on drugs
was an important political issue for President Reagan and Congress,
with the federal government spending hundreds of millions of dollars
to reduce the amount of cocaine and other drugs in the United
such intrusions, to a future case providing an appropriate, and more informed,
basis for deciding these questions." (citations omitted)).
22. Id. at 719-20.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983); Waltzer v. United States,
682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); Doe v. Renfrow,
631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
24. Place, 462 U.S. at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also id. at 723-24 ("Re-
gardless of the validity of a dog sniff under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure
was too intrusive. The Court has no need to decide the issue here. As a matter of
prudence, decision of the issue is also unwise. While the Court has adopted one
plausible analysis of the issue, there are others. For example, a dog sniff may be
a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation
under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion. Neither party has had an opportu-
nity to brief the issue, and the Court grasps for the appropriate analysis of the
problem. Although it is not essential that the Court ever adopt the views of one of
the parties, it should not decide an issue on which neither party has expressed
any opinion at all. The Court is certainly in no position to consider all the ramifi-
cations of this important issue. Certiorari is currently pending in two cases that
present the issue directly. There is no reason to avoid a full airing of the issue in
a proper case." (citations omitted)).
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States.2 5 Unwilling to face the potential public outcry if the war on
drugs were slowed by the Court, Justice O'Connor may have added the
dictum on drug dogs to reduce the existing barriers to prosecution and
ease the traditional limitations on police officers. 2 6 Although this is
admittedly pure speculation, the failure in Place to allow the parties
to at least brief the Court on the topic, failure of the Court to discuss
lower court precedents on the issue, and Justice O'Connor's refusal to
explain the source of her reasoning all allow for such speculation. The
Court's continuing intentional silence on the matter of Justice
O'Connor's sui generis claim only assures that such speculation will
continue.
B. United States v. Jacobsen
The issues at play in Place tangentially arose again the following
year. United States v. Jacobsen2 7 involved a package that had been
damaged during shipment by a common carrier. In order to ascertain
the amount of damage, the carrier opened the package, revealing four
white bags of powder inside. The carrier immediately contacted fed-
eral agents who removed the bags, opened each of the four bags, and
removed a trace of the white substance with a knife. A field chemical
test revealed that the powder removed from the plastic bags was co-
25. DAVID F. DUNCAN, CTR. FOR ALCOHOL & ADDICTION STUDIES, DRUG LAw ENFORCE-
MENT EXPENDITURES AND DRUG-RELATED DEATHS, http://www.druglibrary.org/
schaffer/other/deathsbucks.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
26. See Peter Thornton, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 1167, 1168 ("A Court must decide whether,
as a matter of law, a given police practice is so intrusive that before conducting it
police should be required to have probable cause and either to obtain a warrant or
to demonstrate circumstances constituting a warrant exception. Faced with this
all-or-nothing alternative, a court may be reluctant to hamper police work by im-
posing a warrant requirement in a borderline situation.... Courts have held, for
example, that a given police practice did not constitute a search because police
had good reason to engage in the investigation."); see also Jonathan Todd Laba,
Comment, If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business; Thermal
Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1437, 1444-45 (1996) ("The Court's loosening of Fourth Amendment guarantees
during the past twenty years is motivated, in part, by spiraling crime statistics,
which in turn have directly resulted from the explosion in the drug trade. The
Supreme Court has recognized both the paramount importance of combating the
drug trade, and the tremendous obstacles that police face in confronting highly
organized and hugely profitable drug operations. The fight against crime, and
particularly the war on drugs, has led to intensified research into technologies
intended to give law enforcement officers more powerful tools to detect criminal
activity. Moreover, decreased defense spending has encouraged the conversion of
military technologies for civilian law enforcement use. As the fight against crime
has become more hi-tech, the courts have struggled to articulate a satisfying
method for evaluating these technologies under the Fourth Amendment." (foot-
notes omitted)).
27. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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caine. A second group of agents came and ran the test again, confirm-
ing that the powder was cocaine. Based upon the field tests, the
agents obtained a search warrant for the final shipping address where
more drugs were found. The defendants were then arrested for pos-
session with the intent to distribute.28 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the warrantless field test con-
stituted a significant expansion of the earlier private search and that
a warrant was required for the field test.2 9 The Supreme Court
reversed. 30
The Supreme Court decision focused on the private-search doc-
trine. However, the Court again went beyond the issue required for
the holding and decided that a field test which provides information
only about whether the object tested is or is not contraband does not
constitute a search.
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclu-
sion is not dependent on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances compara-
ble to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such
cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results
are negative-merely disclosing that the substance is something other than
cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has de-
cided-and there is no question about its power to do so-to treat the interest
in "privately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably "pri-
vate" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.
3 1
In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion, authored by Jus-
tice Stevens, relied entirely upon Place: "Here, as in Place, the likeli-
hood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will
actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much
too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth
Amendment."32
Justice Brennan, dissenting, saw the issues as more fundamental.
He pointed out that the Court in defining the term "search" focuses
entirely on what is "sought and revealed," "rather than on the context
in which the information or item is concealed," the traditional Fourth
Amendment question.3 3 He disputed the conclusion here and in Place
that a surveillance technique that identifies only the presence or absence of
contraband is less intrusive than a technique that reveals the precise nature
of an item regardless of whether it is contraband. But by seizing upon this
distinction alone to conclude that the first type of technique, as a general mat-
ter, is not a search, the Court has foreclosed any consideration of the circum-
28. Id. at 111-12.
29. United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 299-300 (8th Cir. 1982).
30. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 126.
31. Id. at 123.
32. Id. at 124.
33. Id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 85:735
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stances under which the technique is used, and may very well have paved the
way for technology to override the limits of law in the area of criminal
investigation.3
4
Most importantly, Brennan keyed in on the real problem with the
Place-Jacobsen exemption from Fourth Amendment judicial over-
sight. He correctly faulted the majority's reasoning in both Place and
Jacobsen which led to this broad exclusion from the classification of a
search.
Although the Court accepts, as it must, the fundamental proposition that an
investigative technique is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment if it intrudes upon a privacy expectation that society considers to be rea-
sonable, the Court has entirely omitted from its discussion the considerations
that have always guided our decisions in this area. In determining whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated, we have always looked to
the context in which an item is concealed, not to the identity of the concealed
item. Thus in cases involving searches for physical items, the Court has
framed its analysis first in terms of the expectation of privacy that normally
attends the location of the item and ultimately in terms of the legitimacy of
that expectation. 3 5
Finally, Justice Brennan predicted the logical outcome of Place and
Jacobsen, which is coming to fruition two decades later.
For example, under the Court's analysis in these cases, law enforcement of-
ficers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog-to paraphrase the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, a "canine cocaine connoisseur"-to roam the streets at
random, alerting the officers to people carrying cocaine. Or, if a device were
developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect instantaneously
whether the person is carrying cocaine, there would be no Fourth Amendment
bar, under the Court's approach, to the police setting up such a device on a
street corner and scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court's analysis is so
unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect, from the outside
of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional
obstacle to the police cruising through a residential neighborhood and using
the device to identify all homes in which the drug is present. In short, under
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment first suggested in Place and first
applied in this case, these surveillance techniques would not constitute
searches and therefore could be freely pursued whenever and wherever law
enforcement officers desire. Hence, at some point in the future, if the Court
stands by the theory it has adopted today, search warrants, probable cause,
and even "reasonable suspicion" may very well become notions of the past.
Fortunately, we know from precedents such as Katz v. United States and Olm-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 138-39. See also Amanda S. Froh, Note, Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The
Impact of Kyllo v. United States, 26 SEArLE U. L. REV. 337, 356 (2002) ("Finally,
the Place rule has been criticized because it justifies the imposition on the indi-
vidual by focusing on the result of the search-illegal contraband. The Jacobsen
Court, in making a reference back to Place, claimed that persons engaging in
private illegal activity have relinquished their expectation of privacy with respect
to the illegal product. However, this is counter to the basic constitutional princi-
ple that what police find as a result of a search cannot play a part in determining
whether the search was justified. In other words, the ends do not always justify
the means, though the Place rule suggests differently where drug-sniffing dogs
are concerned.").
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stead v. United States, that this Court ultimately stands ready to prevent this
Orwellian world from coming to pass.3 6
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan was only half right. The horrors he
predicted have come true, but the Supreme Court has shown no incli-
nation to undo the Orwellian world.
C. Illinois v. Caballes
Illinois v. Caballes37 raised the issue of whether the rule in Place
would apply to a dog sniffing an automobile during a lawful traffic
stop. Underlying this question is the more basic principle of whether
a police officer may expand a lawful traffic stop by questioning the
motorist about unrelated offenses and seeking consent from the mo-
torist to search the vehicle. In Ohio v. Robinette, the United States
Supreme Court found no fault with the routine expansion of lawful
traffic stops, even one that involved a brief detention of the motorist
beyond the time necessary to issue a warning for speeding.38 On the
other hand, a Terry stop allows police only to use the least intrusive
means to confirm or dispel the suspicion which gave rise to the stop
and may not be expanded to other matters absent at least reasonable
suspicion about those other matters. Although Justice Ginsburg's dis-
sent in Caballes raises the issues that (1) a routine traffic stop is
analagous to a Terry stop,39 and (2) the stop must be "reasonably re-
lated in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference,"40
the Caballes majority was no more concerned about the expansion of
the scope of the inquiry than the Court had been in Robinette. In sum-
mary, a lawful traffic stop exposes a motorist to inquiry about other
crimes, including a dog sniff of the vehicle for illegal drugs, without
36. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also
Laba, supra note 26, at 1472 ("Second, technology can shape, alter, and ulti-
mately diminish citizens' privacy expectations over time. Once, individuals could
reasonably expect that when they arrived home and closed their doors, the police
would not be able to enter without a warrant. Now, technology-enhanced
searches allow the police to sidestep such expectations. In an era when devices
such as thermal imagers are common, citizens can no longer be assured that their
seemingly private activities are actually private."); Paul St. Lawrence, Note,
Kyllo: A Libertarian Defense Against Orwellian Enforcement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, Fall 2002, at 155, 169 ("Limiting police surveillance to technology that
does not enhance standard human sensory perception would not unduly burden
law enforcement. Nor would it bind the police to the methods they employed in
the 1780s. It would preserve the individual's freedom from unreasonable
searches so that individual liberty will not be sacrificed to technological
progress.").
37. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
38. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38-40 (1996).
39. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A routine traffic stop.., is a
relatively brief encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop ...
than to a formal arrest.'" (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998))).
40. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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any predicate for the expanded inquiry. The majority did indicate
that the detention may not be unreasonably extended to accommodate
the expanded inquiry or to facilitate the arrival of the drug dog to the
scene of the stop.4 1
Justice Stevens' majority opinion recycled the Place-Jacobsen doc-
trine and concluded that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a concededly
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location
of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not
violate the Fourth Amendment."42 He did, however, contend that
there was nothing inconsistent between this decision and the 2001 de-
cision in Kyllo v. United States, which disallowed the use of a thermal
imaging device on a home:
Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting
lawful activity-in that case, intimate details in a home, such as "at what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." The
legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will re-
main private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or ex-
pectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his
car.
4 3
Justice Souter, dissenting, finally raised one persistently ignored
issue by challenging the assumption that drug dogs are nearly infalli-
ble. That unsubstantiated claim in Place was finally addressed as
Justice Souter produced high rates of dog error, noting that false posi-
tives had been measured and accepted by courts at 7%, 12.5%, and
60%. Justice Souter pointed out that "the evidence is clear that the
dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times."44
Furthermore, Justice Souter noted that false alerts are endemic due to
the constant presence of cocaine on American currency. The enor-
mous range has two distinct effects: it demonstrates that the dog can-
not be considered "sui generis" and it demonstrates even greater
unreliability by individual dogs due to inconsistency. Without consis-
tency, broad statements regarding the accuracy of drug dogs are pa-
tently false because individual dogs differ greatly in their abilities.
Without such generalizations, the "accuracy of a drug dog" cannot be
41. Id. at 407-08 (majority opinion); cf Pryor v. State, 716 A.2d 338 (Md. App. 1998)
(twenty-minute detention of motorist stopped for traffic offense while waiting for
trained narcotics dog to be brought to the scene was unreasonable); see also State
v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697-98 (Ohio 1995) ("When the motivation behind a
police officer's continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not
related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that contin-
ued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of
some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the contin-
ued detention constitutes an illegal seizure."), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 33
(1996).
42. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
43. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001)).
44. Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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measured beyond one individual dog, which cannot be the basis for
sweeping statements about the accuracy of all dogs. Justice Souter
concluded that once the dog's fallibility is recognized, it ends the justi-
fication in Place for treating the sniff as sui generis.4 5 He also stated
that, "given the fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a
process that may disclose 'intimate details' without revealing contra-
band, just as the thermal imaging device might do as described in
Kyllo v. United States."4 6 Finally, Justice Souter warned of the slip-
pery slope that Caballes presents:
The portent of this very case, however, adds insistence to the call, for an un-
critical adherence to Place would render the Fourth Amendment indifferent to
suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and
pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to
Fourth Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment review entirely un-
less it is treated as a search.4 7
In the years between Place and Caballes, Justice Brennan's hope
that the Supreme Court would step forward to halt the erosion of
Fourth Amendment rights has not been fulfilled. Coupled with the
ruling in United States v. Whren 48 that a police officer's motivation for
a stop or arrest is not subject to review if there is an objective basis for
the stop (reasonable suspicion) or arrest (probable cause), the affirma-
tion of the Place doctrine in Illinois v. Caballes allows police officers to
lawfully stop a vehicle for any trivial violation and then subject that
vehicle to a check by a drug dog.49 Caballes and Whren operate in
tandem, allowing police to stop virtually any motorist and, by the use
of a drug dog, check the motorist's car for drugs at the whim of a police
officer, even if a reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
car for such a trivial offense, 50 or even if the real reason for the stop is
45. Id.
46. Id. at 413.
47. Id. at 410-11 (majority opinion).
48. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
49. See John F. Decker, Christopher Kopacz & Christina Toto, Curbing Aggressive
Police Tactics During Routine Traffic Stops in Illinois, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 819,
869-70 (2005) ("Under the United States Supreme Court's decision, an officer
conducting a routine traffic stop is never required to justify a sniff for narcotics
with any suspicion whatsoever. A motorist stopped for failing to wear a seat belt
or for driving with a burned-out registration light is subject to a canine sniff, even
without any indication that the car contains illegal substances.").
50. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-14 ("Recognizing that we have been unwilling to en-
tertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individ-
ual officers, petitioners disavow any intention to make the individual officer's
subjective good faith the touchstone of 'reasonableness.' They insist that the
standard they have put forward-whether the officer's conduct deviated materi-
ally from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circum-
stances would not have made the stop for the reasons given-is an 'objective' one.
But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputa-
bly driven by subjective considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police
from doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do
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not the traffic violation but the race of the motorist. 5 1 Where race is
the motivation, the motorist may have an equal protection claim, but
not a Fourth Amendment claim. 52
On the theory that every motorist commits multiple trivial traffic
violations every time he gets behind the wheel, Whren allows a police
officer to target a particular motorist-for good reason, bad reason, or
no reason at all-and then wait until the motorist commits a traffic
violation, thereby allowing the officer to stop the motorist's car.
Whren even allows police to follow a car until the motorist commits
the most insignificant traffic violation, thereby allowing the officer to
for different reasons. Petitioners' proposed standard may not use the word 'pre-
text,' but it is designed to combat nothing other than the perceived 'danger' of the
pretextual stop, albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases. Instead of asking
whether the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would
have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to
believe that the officer had the proper state of mind.").
51. Cf United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dis-
senting) ("Harvey and his companions committed minor traffic violations. They
drove three miles over the speed limit in a car which was missing a bumper and a
headlight. Indisputably, probable cause existed to believe a traffic offense oc-
curred. The problem, however, is the officer said he stopped the vehicle because
the occupants were African-Americans. Officer Collardey testified if the occu-
pants had not been African-Americans, he would not have stopped the car. Of-
ficer Collardey's improper motivation for the stop inserted an unconstitutional
illegality into the stop. Applying the Ferguson test, because a minor traffic viola-
tion was present, the majority concludes Collardey's primary race-based motiva-
tion, although illegal, is irrelevant. Equal Protection principles absolutely and
categorically prohibit state actors from using race to differentiate between motor-
ists. Yet, the majority acquiesces to an officer's substitution of race for probable
cause and essentially licenses the state to discriminate. Moreover, the majority
states race-based motivation is irrelevant under these or any circumstances. Not
only is the officer's race-based motivation relevant, it is patently
unconstitutional.").
52. See Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 533
(6th Cir. 2002) ("The plaintiffs allege that Trooper Kiefer singled them out for
inquiry into their immigration status on the basis of their Hispanic appearance
during the course of a lawful traffic stop. The plaintiffs do not challenge the va-
lidity of their initial stop for a faulty headlight. Nor do they assert that the ques-
tioning exceeded the permissible scope of the stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Nevertheless, as this court has recognized, '[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States, confirmed that an of-
ficer's discriminatory motivations for pursuing a course of action can give rise to
an Equal Protection claim, even where there are sufficient objective indicia of
suspicion to justify the officer's actions under the Fourth Amendment: 'We of
course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforce-
ment of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional ba-
sis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.'" (citation omitted)
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996))).
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make a legal stop. So long as there is an objective basis, Whren pro-
hibits the reviewing court from examining the officer's true reasons
for the stop. Under Whren, such a stop is.lawful even though a rea-
sonable officer would not have interfered with the motorist's liberty
interest over such a trivial matter. Once pulled over, the motorist's
car is subject to an examination at the officer's discretion. Since a
drug dog sniff does not constitute a search, the officer need not provide
a justification for summoning the drug dog.
Caballes only dealt with a legally stopped vehicle. As in Place, the
object which was the subject of the drug dog sniff had been legally
seized under Fourth Amendment standards. However, the Fourth
Amendment analysis of the seizure is not essential to the doctrine.
There is no limitation in either Place or Caballes that a drug dog can
only be directed at objects or cars which have been seized and are
therefore subject to a Fourth Amendment inquiry about the legality of
the seizure. Police may direct a drug dog towards objects and vehicles
which have not been seized. In the case of vehicles, police may walk a
drug dog around vehicles that are legally parked or are stopped at
traffic lights, so long as the dog sniff does not otherwise prolong the
stop at the light. Once the dog alerts, under Caballes the officer has
probable cause to prolong the stop and conduct a warrantless
search. 53
III. THE DRUG DOG
Maggie, a mixed-breed Benji-type dog, was the Katz family pet for
eleven years. She was less a pet than a member of the family. We
rescued her from the pound the day before her time there would have
been up, something she always seemed to understand. When she
died, my family, and others who knew her, grieved-we still grieve-
as though we had lost a human member of the family. She was known
in the family as "BDE" (Best Dog Ever), and my younger daughter
said that Maggie ruined it for every future dog any family member
would ever have.
No one who met Maggie ever felt threatened. In fact, in eleven
years, she only met one person she did not like, and that was someone
approaching Maggie and my wife as they were walking in the woods
53. See Decker et al., supra note 49, at 870 ("Morever, as Justice Ginsburg noted in
her dissent, the Court's decision clears the way for officers to sue the dogs in
many other situations. For example, officers could walk trained dogs along
parked cars or cars waiting at a stoplight, and a dog's positive response would
invariably justify the officers' detention of the motorist to further investigate the
presence of drugs. In addition, there is little in the Court's opinion that would
prevent officers from conducting dog sniffs along the exterior of garages or per-
haps even residences. Finally, the decision may authorize dog sniffs of people in
a wide variety of public places, such as schools, courthouses, and bus stations.").
[Vol. 85:735
CURBING THE DOG
one predawn morning. Maggie's response was a low growl and a
nudge of my wife to another path. It was such an uncharacteristic
reaction that my wife did not question Maggie's instinct. Ordinarily,
Maggie approached each new person as her newest best friend, some-
one else who would admire her and amazingly often get down and hug
her. I once took Maggie to a first-year Criminal Law review session.
She was absolutely thrilled. There were ninety new friends whom she
immediately greeted one at a time, going from seat-to-seat and visit-
ing with each student.
Why would we tell you about Maggie other than to pay tribute to
the best dog ever? We have introduced Maggie to contrast her with
the dogs used in this country to detect drugs. The drug dogs may be
beautiful, but they are chosen more for their imposing size than for
their beauty. Drug dogs are generally large work dogs, German Shep-
herds and Doberman Pinschers, who often intimidate those with
whom they come in contact. 5 4 While they may be lovable when at
home with their handlers' families, these dogs are not seeking human
affection when they are on the job. While that may be acceptable
when the dog is used to detect drugs in an inanimate object such as a
package, a car, or a school locker, more and more often these dogs are
being focused on humans, especially schoolchildren. Even the "pas-
sive alert" dogs will touch and poke with their nose parts of the bodies
they are scrutinizing for drugs. 55 One U.S. government website
warns that a "potential down-side" of the use of guard dogs is that
they may bite which "may result in significant criminal or civil liabil-
ity."56 Consequently, it is important to remember that drug dogs are
not Maggies.
The Place doctrine that a dog sniff is not a search rests upon three
premises: (1) that a dog sniff is a minor intrusion, (2) that a dog dis-
54. Some historical uses of police dogs include corralling and killing people in concen-
tration camps, hunting escaped slaves, and breaking up civil rights protests. Eric
Squire, History of Police Dogs and Military Dogs, http://www.geocities.comleric-
squire/articles/dogshist.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006); see also Homer D. Wam-
pler, Jr. & Dee Wampler, The K-9 on Trial: Dogged Pursuit, 46 J. Mo. B. 381, 381
(1990) ("Since 1900, our canine friends have not always enjoyed the best job as-
signments in law enforcement. At the turn of the century, New York City police
first used police dogs as a 'first responder.' Later visions of well-trained and fero-
cious German Shepherd war dogs appeared during World War II. In March 1965,
the use of German Shepherds by Birmingham Police Chief, 'Bull' Conner, nipping
the behinds of civil rights protesters, left an unfavorable impression. In Vietnam,
many were used to sniff mines, alert soldiers to trip wires or enemy ambushes.").
55. Charlie Mesloh, Excerpts from "An Overview of Canine Apprehension Methodolo-
gies and Their Relationship to Bite Ratios," (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.k9fleck.
org/biteratios.htm.
56. U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, USCG PORT SECURITY
ASSESSMENT: BEST PRACTICES BULLETIN, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/
Best%20Practice%20K9.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
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closes nothing other than whether the object of the sniff contains con-
traband or the person subject to the sniff is carrying contraband, and
(3) that dogs are extremely accurate when discerning the presence of
illegal drugs. As a result of these three characteristics, the Court held
that the drug dog is sui generis.5 7 The Place doctrine is entirely de-
pendant upon the accuracy of these three premises. However, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Place failed to cite any authority for
these conclusions. Moreover, in 2005, when the Supreme Court ex-
tended the Place doctrine to dog sniffs of automobiles in Illinois v.
Caballes (as lower courts had anticipated for two decades), Justice
Stevens' majority opinion again failed to proffer any authority, beyond
Place itself, for the accuracy of these conclusions. And again in 2005,
in Florida v. Rabb,58 the Court appears to have extended the Place
doctrine to homes when it summarily reversed a Florida appellate
court decision, without briefing and without argument, simply re-
manding to the lower court to reconsider the case in light of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Caballes. Consequently, this crucial
doctrine stands with no support and without empirical data. Most im-
portantly, its conclusions are wrong.
A. A Dog Sniff is Not a Minor Intrusion
In Place, Justice O'Connor presumed that a dog sniff is a minor
intrusion, which may be true when the intrusion involves an inani-
mate object similar to the suitcase involved in the actual case.5 9 How-
ever, the same cannot be said when the subject of a sniff is a home or a
human being.60 The physiology of the dog prevents air from passing
57. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
58. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005).
59. See Thornton, supra note 26, at 1199 ("[T]he dog makes a more limited examina-
tion than the magnetometer in two senses: the animal causes the passenger no
annoyance, inconvenience, or humiliation and discloses the presence only of con-
traband, not of innocent objects. Given the reliability of the method and the rela-
tively limited nature of the intrusion, a court could reasonably hesitate to require
police to obtain a warrant or even to have probable cause before initiating canine
surveillance."); see also Laba, supra note 26, at 1469 ("[Als the Court recognized
in Place, a dog sniff is fairly unobtrusive because it only detects the presence or
absence of contraband. It does not disclose an individual's brand of toothpaste,
color of underwear, or type of reading material, all of which would be exposed if
the police were to open and search a subject's luggage."); id. at 1484 ("The intru-
siveness inquiry is not limited to the physical penetration of objects or spaces.
Also relevant is the degree to which the government inspection interferes with
the subject's normal use of the property. In Riley, the Court held that a helicop-
ter flight over Riley's property was not a search because, among other factors, the
helicopter caused 'no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.' Simi-
larly, a dog sniff is less intrusive than a typical luggage search where an officer
physically rummages through the contents of the luggage.").
60. See Froh, supra note 35, at 354 ("Most would agree that having a dog sniff a
person for drugs would be intrusive and would probably subject the individual to
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directly over its smell receptors when breathing normally because a
dog's smell receptors are located in the back of its snout. This is why
they "sniff' at the air or objects.6 1 The dog's habit of sniffing often
causes its nose to come into contact with its target, a disturbing result
when the subject is a person. 62
Moreover, there is a danger that the drug dog may bite the subject
of the drug sniff. Drug dogs are trained to alert in one of two ways:
aggressively or passively. An aggressive-alert dog scratches and/or
bites at its target, while a passive-alert dog sits or lies down in the
presence of its target. Obviously, only passive-alert dogs can be used
to detect the presence of illegal narcotics on a person. However, a
study in Florida of dogs used to apprehend criminal suspects showed a
significant number of suspects, one in six, were bitten by dogs who
were trained not to bite the suspect but only to bark to hold the sus-
pect in place. 6 3 This study raises sincere concerns about the use of
passive drug dogs to smell people. Passive-alert dogs are likely to paw
and shove their snouts on to the body of the person, and the danger
that the dog will bite the subject can never be totally eliminated.
some embarrassment, inconvenience, and perhaps fear."); see also Wampler &
Wampler, supra note 54, at 384 ("The sniffing of people, or objects first seized
from people implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests not present in mere
objects. If a canine sniff of an object is not a search it seems that use of a dog to
sniff a person is a search since the 'embarrassment may violate feelings of per-
sonal dignity,' and is indecent and demeaning." (citation omitted)); Marnee Mil-
ner, Case Summary, Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d 1260
(9th Cir. 1999), 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 207, 213 (2000) ("A dog sniff by itself
often illicits irrational fear. Compounded with a sudden and unannounced
search the dog sniff now takes on a distressing and intrusive character. In addi-
tion, a dog sniff of the body intrudes upon the body and its odors which are highly
personal. Thus, the expectation interests of the students are not minimal.").
61. Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County, supra note 2; see Honsinger,
supra note 17, at 1104 ("In fact, a dog's sense of smell is roughly eight times more
sensitive than that of humans . . . ."); see also Wampler & Wampler, supra note
54, at 381 ("Their [dogs'] keen sense of smell, by different estimates, has been
held to be at least eight times more sensitive than a human's. The ability of dogs
to detect the sense of humans, explosives, or drugs, is unquestioned if properly
trained. An 'alert' or 'reaction' causes the dog to bark, whine, snarl, or paw in the
area of the scent."); Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and Reliabil-
ity of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405, 408 (1996) ("A dog's nose is
uniquely equipped to detect the faintest of odors. Dogs possess potentially bil-
lions of chemical receptors called olfactory cells. These receptors are located
among large supports inside the dog's nose named turbinate bones. Turbinate
bones form numerous cylindrical passages that allow air exposure to millions
more cells than is possible with simple tubular nasal passages, such as those
found in human beings. Laid out, the surface area of these cells would cover a
space the area of the skin on the dog's body. In comparison, the surface area of
human olfactory cells would cover no more than a postage stamp.").
62. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1023 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Mesloh, supra note 55.
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B. A Trained Drug Dog Does Not Only Alert to Contraband
The linchpin of the Place doctrine that a dog sniff is not a search is
that the dog only alerts to contraband, not to any lawfully possessed
object in which a person may have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.6 4 Putting aside Justice Brennan's argument that this approach
turns the Fourth Amendment on its head by focusing on what is
sought and found rather than where the search takes place,6 5 the le-
gitimacy of the Court's approach depends upon whether in fact the dog
is able to distinguish between contraband and noncontraband. The
Court in Place offered no support for its conclusion that the dog could
be so discerning, and it is not at all clear that such support exists.
Expanding the dog's abilities beyond those the Court expressly ac-
knowledged in Place, some dogs are trained not only to alert to illegal
drugs, but also to locate pharmaceuticals and alcohol, neither of which
are intrinsically contraband. 66 The dog is unaware if the subject may
legally possess alcohol or whether that person has a lawful prescrip-
tion for the pharmaceutical. However, as dogs do not use separate
alerts to indicate for individual substances, the handler cannot dis-
cern whether the dog has alerted for potentially legal alcohol or pro-
hibited heroin. In Fitzgerald v. State, the dog was trained to alert to
Diazapam, the generic form of valium, one of the most commonly pre-
scribed drugs in the United States.67 While this expansion of the
dog's capabilities could be easily remedied by reverting to the original
parameters of sniffing for only contraband, the intentional ignorance
64. See Froh, supra note 35, at 355 ("The Place rationale is criticized also because its
efficacy depends on the infallibility of the tactic; that is, in order not to invade a
person's privacy, the well-trained dog must never falsely alert to a subject with-
out contraband, or the field test must never indicate a false positive for cocaine.
In reality, false alerts and false positives do occur, and no investigative tactic is
foolproof. In the case of these tactics, when a mistake occurs, serious intrusions
on the privacy of individuals could result. For this reason, some argue, drug-
sniffing dogs should not be given carte blanche in society."). But see Thomas H.
Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on
Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV 75, 89 (1976) ("Although both provide a method of
perception several times more effective than the human sense replaced, canine
sniffing, unlike electronic surveillance, is directed exclusively toward a particular
illicit substance. Unlike wiretapping which, even in Katz-type situations where
agents consciously attempt to minimize the intrusion, is 'almost inherently indis-
criminate,' canine intrusion is highly discriminate. Any inaccuracy of the canine
detective works in favor of the searchee, and the canine intrusion has none of the
inhibitory effects of wiretapping." (footnote omitted)).
65. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. See K-9 Detection-Canine Bomb Detection & Canine Narcotics Detection &
Searches, http://www.k9detection.net/index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2006)
("Our Narcotics canines are certified in the following contraband materials: Alco-
hol, Cocaine, Ecstasy, Heroin, Marijuana, Methamphetamine, and various Gun
Powders.").
67. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1018 (Md. 2004).
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of the courts has allowed dog handlers to operate without oversight,
resulting in an expansion of Place beyond its original intentions.
Even with its superior sense of smell, it is not possible for a dog to
distinguish the scent of all contraband from otherwise legal sub-
stances. Heroine is a derivative of opium. The odor in heroin which
alerts the dog is acetic acid, a common substance used in pickles and
certain glues. 68 In addition, thirty-two legal prescriptions containing
opioid compounds are currently prescribed by doctors. 69 Further,
some narcotics such as cocaine can be legally possessed. 70 Even
though prescription drugs do not have any odor when manufactured,
once they are exposed to air the process of hydrolysis causes them to
give off the odor of acetic acid, the same distinctive odor given off by
heroin.7 '
Courts are split as to whether an alert to methyl benzoate-which
is the tell-tale odor of cocaine but is found in many legal products 72 -
is actually an alert to cocaine. The argument in favor is that a dog's
alert is probable cause because of the large concentration of methyl
benzoate in cocaine which may not be matched by the same concentra-
68. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Woodford, Ph.D, Chemist (July 11, 2005).
Dr. Woodford is authorized to conduct testing of controlled substances in DEA-
licensed laboratories.
69. Narcotic Analgesics, MONTHLY PRESCRIBING REFERENCE, June 2005, at 286,
286-95 (listing Balacet 324, Butorphanol Nasal Spray, Combunox, Darvocet-N
50, Darvon Compound 32, Darvon Compound 65, Darvon-N, Demerol, Dilaudid,
Duragesic, Lortab, Maxidone, Norco, Nubain, Oxycontin, Oxyir, Palladone,
Panlor SS, Percocet, Percodan, Synalgos-DC, Talacen, Talwin-NX, Tylenol w. Co-
deine #3, Tylox, Vicodin, Vicoprofen, Zydone, Avinza (contains morphine deriva-
tive), Kadian (contains morphine derivative), MS Contin (contains morphine
derivative), MSIR (contains morphine derivative)).
70. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Motions FYI: Illinois v. Caballes: Some Disturbing Ques-
tions, CHAMPION, May 2005, at 38, 38 ("[Nlarcotics drugs such as morphine, and
even cocaine, can be lawfully possessed with a prescription. They are Schedule II
substances under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. They can also be law-
fully possessed by those who are licensed to dispense them.").
71. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Woodford, supra note 68.
72. ChemicalLand2l.com, Methyl Benzoate, http://chemicalland21.com/arokorhi/
specialtychemfinechemMETHYL%20BENZOATE.htm (last visited Dec. 21,
2006) ("Benzoic acid, a white, crystalline organic compound, is a family carboxylic
acids. It has a carboxyl group bound directly to a benzene ring. Though it occurs
naturally in some plants, it is commercially manufactured by the reaction of tolu-
ene with oxygen at temperatures around 200 C in the presence of cobalt and man-
ganese salts as catalysts. Pure benzoic acid melts at 122 C and is very slightly
soluble in water. It is widely used as a food preservative, normally as the sodium,
potassium, or calcium salts and their derivatives especially in acid foods. Benzo-
ate preservatives applications in foods, drugs and personal products are well es-
tablished."); Methyl Benzoate, http://www.thegoodscentscompany.com/data/
rw1015011.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (demonstrating that methyl benzoate
is naturally present in bilberry, clove, cranberry, black currant, gardenia, jonquil,
kiwi fruit, narcissus, tuberose, and ylang ylang, and is used as a perfume in bub-
ble gum).
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tion in legally possessed objects.7 3 However, the nature of methyl
benzoate is that it is not stable when exposed to air; therefore, it dissi-
pates quickly. Although cocaine emits the highest levels of methyl
benzoate, it is soon reduced to levels consistent with legal products as
methyl benzoate has a half-life of only ten to thirty days.7 4 Trainers
are left with an interesting proposition: train drug dogs to alert to low
levels of methyl benzoate and therefore falsely alert to many legal
products, or only alert to high levels of methyl benzoate and therefore
risk an increase in false negatives when cocaine is exposed to air for
any significant amount of time. Further complicating the use of drug
dogs to accurately locate cocaine, it is estimated that cocaine tracings
can be found on more than 90% of American currency. 7 5 Courts have
held that a positive dog sniff on currency has "minimal evidentiary
value" due to the endemic presence of cocaine on American currency. 76
Thus, it is not altogether clear that a drug dog trained to alert to co-
caine by detecting the smell of methyl benzoate is actually alerting to
the presence of the illegal substance rather than one of the many law-
ful products containing a similar concentration of the same compound.
The same controversy surrounds the ability of a dog to discern ma-
rijuana or hashish, and its ability to distinguish the drug from legal
objects which have the same odors, such as hemp products, and fir and
juniper trees. 77 Dr. James Woodford, an expert in the field of chemis-
try, contends that it is impossible to Pavlovian train dogs to detect
marijuana because (1) there are more than sixty different odors for
strains of marijuana and hashish, and (2) each component has a dis-
tinct and different odor.78 While the human nose is less sensitive
than the canine nose, humans are able to reason that the odor of mari-
juana exists because of the human brain's deductive capabilities. A
dog is actually at a disadvantage because of its lack of deductive rea-
soning and increased olfactory capabilities, not allowing it to reason
that the scent of marijuana is present due to the wide variety of mari-
juana odors. The scent may indeed be that of marijuana, but a dog's
73. United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy
Dollars ($30,670.00), 403 F.3d 448, 462 (7th Cir. 2005) ("In addition, the very
ephemeral nature of the methyl benzoate byproduct of illicit cocaine makes it
highly likely that Calhoun's cash hoard was in very close proximity to large
amounts of the drug within hours or days of Bax alerting to it.").
74. Mallinckrodt Chemicals, Material Data Safety Sheet, Methyl Benzoate, http:/!
www.jtbaker.com/msds/englishhtml/m3l46.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
75. United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred & Fifty-Eight
Dollars ($639,558) in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
76. United States v. Buchanan, 213 F.3d 302, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2000).
77. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Woodford, supra note 68. However, the au-
thors were allowed to test a drug dog in the Cleveland area to see if it would
falsely alert to hemp soap or a pair of pants made out of hemp. The dog was
uninterested in the hemp products.
78. Id.
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nose is so exact that it could fail to alert due to a slight variation in
odor and its inexperience with each of the sixty different odors for
which it is sniffing.
C. A Well-Trained Dog is Not Extremely Accurate When
Alerting to Illegal Drugs
The third rationale behind the doctrine in Place-the high degree
of accuracy of a drug dog-raises three separate issues and problems:
false-alert rates, dog certification, and handler error.
1. False-Alert Rates
Existing case law demonstrates that the false-alert rate among cer-
tified drug dogs varies greatly. Further, the assertion in Place that
drug dogs are highly accurate was not supported by any authority or
empirical studies; Justice O'Connor's majority opinion simply stated
the conclusion as an established fact. In Illinois v. Caballes, Justice
Stevens' majority opinion simply relied upon Place for the proposition
that drug dogs are highly accurate. Thus the Court relied upon itself
for that proposition, even though Place offered no evidence to buttress
its conclusion.
Dissenting from the Court's opinion in Caballes, only Justice Sou-
ter offered support for his conclusion that "[t]he infallible dog... is a
creature of legal fiction."79 Relying on state and federal cases, Justice
Souter listed instances where drug dogs were far from accurate: one
dog had a 71% accuracy rate,8 0 another dog falsely alerted four out of
nineteen times while working for the postal service and 8% of the time
over its career,8 1 a dog that gave false positives between 7% and 38%
of the time was accepted by a court as reliable,8 2 and another had
made between ten and fifty errors.8 3 Justice Souter also took issue
with the state's brief, which argued that dog sniffs are "generally reli-
able." Justice Souter noted that the state cited only to a report which
"show[ed] that dogs in artificial testing situations return false posi-
tives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depending on the
length of the search."8 4 This evidence led Justice Souter to conclude
79. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.
1998)).
81. Id. (citing United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 & n.3 (10th Cir.
1997)).
82. Id. (citing United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001)).
83. Id. (citing Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (Ark. 2001)).
84. Id. (citing Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (No. 03-
923); K. GARNER ET AL., DUTY CYCLE OF THE DETECTOR DOG: A BASELINE STUDY 12
(2001)).
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that, "[i]n practical terms, the evidence is clear that the dog that alerts
hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times."8 5
Justice Souter's conclusion is based on a limited sample of data but
is more factually based than the majority opinions in both Place and
Caballes, which offered no data before crafting their specific exception
to the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, most of the funded re-
search in the area is not devoted to determining the percentage of
false alerts, as no government agency using dogs is willing to fund
research that may undercut its broad power devoid of oversight be-
stowed by Place. Instead, the funded research concentrates upon im-
proving the effectiveness of drug dogs by eliminating "misses when
drug dealers attempt to disguise a drug's odor with extraneous
odors."8 6
Furthermore, the false-alert data is statistically misleading as a
focus for determining whether a drug dog is accurate. Although most
courts would commend a dog when it is 90% accurate, the 10% error
rate is troubling when considering actual field conditions. The over-
whelming majority of subjects in the field do not possess contraband, a
fact most courts fail to appreciate when examining false-alert data. If
1 out of every 100 subjects possesses contraband, a dog operating at a
90% accuracy rate is 90% likely to positively alert to that specific crim-
inal. However, a more complete understanding of the error rate de-
mands acknowledgment of the number of false positives among the
remaining ninety-nine individuals who are also sniffed by a drug dog.
If the same dog is used on the remaining innocent individuals, the dog
will continue to be only 90% accurate in its determination of the lack
of contraband, allowing for ten false positives.8 7 Therefore, in a realis-
tic field sample, one individual possessing contraband is discovered
while ten innocent people are subjected to a complete search if the dog
sniffs as accurately as 90%.88 As Justice Souter demonstrated in his
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., L. Paul Waggoner et al., Effects of Extraneous Odors on Canine Detec-
tion, http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/ibds/pdf/extraneous-odors.pdf (last visited
Dec. 21, 2006); Marc Williams et al., Canine Substance Detection: Operational
Capabilities, http://www.vetmed.auburn.edu/ibds/pdf/substance-detection.pdf
(last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
87. The authors have rounded the actual figure of 9.9 to 10.
88. See Fredric I. Lederer & Calvin M. Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by
Marijuana Detection Dogs, AR4Y LAW., April 1973, at 12, 15, available at http://
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/04-1973.pdf ("The fact that a dog can find
only 10% of planted material only indicates that perhaps 90% of contraband hold-
ers will escape detection. Since the fourth amendment protects privacy, one
should be more concerned over how many innocent people will have their privacy
invaded. Thus the percentage of 'true' alerts to total alerts is important."); see
also Bird, supra note 61, at 427 ("If a dog commits a false negative, and fails to
alert to a person with drugs, the smuggler or other person in possession of drugs
gets away. The cost of such a failure is that the narcotics are not removed from
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dissent, courts have accepted accuracy rates far lower than 90%, toler-
ating far more false positives.
To reduce the number of innocent people being searched due to the
false alert of a drug dog, an officer should be required to have some
previous information regarding the individual that raises the suspi-
cion that he may possess contraband. Such a policy would reduce the
number of innocent people searched as a result of a false positive, as
the sample would become more selective, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that the members actually possess contraband.8 9
2. Certification as a Substitute for False-Alert Data
Compounding the issues surrounding false-alert rates is the
marked disinterest demonstrated by many courts in the false-alert
rate of drug dogs. As the Court's determination that a dog sniff is not
a search is based upon a high degree of accuracy, lower courts should
examine the accuracy rate of the dog involved in a particular case. A
U.S. military court prior to Place held that probable cause on the basis
of a dog sniff could only be established if the officer reviewing the
probable cause is familiar with the details of the dog's training, certifi-
cation process, and the track record.90 A military study of drug dogs
about the same time also concluded that "there is no reason to believe
that knowledge of the mere fact that a dog has graduated from a mili-
tary drug-detection course will be held sufficient reason to accept a
circulation and a criminal goes unapprehended. The cost of a false positive is
more severe. Police resources are wasted pursuing a false lead. More impor-
tantly, an innocent individual is potentially subjected to an unnecessary invasion
of privacy. Therefore any assessment of canine reliability must take into primary
account the number of potential false positives that may occur.").
89. See United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 631 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A canine alert,
however, does not constitute probable cause in a completely random setting, such
as an airport, because of its questionable accuracy."); see also United States v.
Fernandez, 772 F.2d 495, 498 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("[T]he mere fact
that a dog has 'hit' on a piece of baggage or cargo does not, in the absence of any
factors supporting its reliability, establish probable cause.").
90. See United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 434-35 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1972)
("The critical question here is what the commander knew about [the drug dog's]
ability at the time he authorized the search. The record demonstrates convinc-
ingly that he knew very little .... On the other hand, the record clearly shows
some of the things that the commander did not know. To illustrate, upon being
examined by trial defense counsel, the commander admitted that he did not know
or had not been advised of what exact training [the drug dog] had received; what
standards or criteria were used to select dogs for marijuana detection training;
what standards a dog was required to meet to have successfully completed the
training course; or what record [the drug dog] had in finding marijuana prior to
the day in question." (emphasis omitted)).
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dog's reliability without further inquiry."9 1 Professor Wayne LaFave
takes the position that "reliability" and "training" are not synony-
mous. Rather, LaFave suggests the following:
In light of the careful training which these dogs receive, an "alert" by a dog is
deemed to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search if a sufficient
showing is made as to the reliability of the particular dog used in detecting the
presence of a particular type of contraband.
9 2
Thus the individual dog's track record and an examination of its certi-
fication are essential to determine the credibility of the dog's alert
when deciding whether the dog's signal should constitute probable
cause.
93
However, courts generally are disinterested in discovering the indi-
vidual dog's error rate. 94 In United States v. Venema, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the fact that the dog was a "trained, certified, marijuana
sniffing dog" was sufficient to establish probable cause without knowl-
edge of the particular dog's error rate.9 5 A determination of a dog's
credibility is analogous to establishing the credibility of a police in-
formant. In both cases, establishing credibility should demand consid-
eration of the dog's or informant's prior history, including not only the
dog or informant's prior alerts or tips that led to the discovery of the
specific evidence, but, of equal importance, the number of prior false-
alerts or bad tips.
91. Lederer & Lederer, supra note 88, at 14. See also United States v. Florez, 871 F.
Supp. 1411, 1420 (D.N.M. 1994) ('The fact that a dog is certified should not be
sufficient in and of itself to establish probable cause.").
92. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 2.2(f), at 450 (3d ed. 1996).
93. See, e.g., Matheson v. State, 870 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("Thus, the
proposition advanced by the State is that the fact that a dog has been trained and
certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, justifies an officer's reliance on the
dog's alert to establish probable cause to search. But our review of the record and
of pertinent literature convinces us that this is not enough.")
94. See Bird, supra note 61, at 417 ("The Court has not yet addressed the specific
qualifications that a 'trained canine' possesses. Also, the Court has never ques-
tioned the accuracy record of a particular canine in practice. As a result, lower
courts have attempted to fill the gap and determine when a canine alert may be
accepted as reliable."); see also Dave Hunter, Comment, Common Scents: Estab-
lishing a Presumption of Reliability for Detector Dog Teams Used in Airports in
Light of the Current Terrorist Threat, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 89, 96 (2002) ("[A]Ill
courts require some evidence to demonstrate the reliability of the detector dog in
question, usually by a handler merely testifying that the dog is trained and relia-
ble. Most courts do not require evidence of the handler's training .... Finally,
specific record keeping requirements regarding either training or accuracy have
not yet been established.").
95. 563 F.2d 1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Sentovich, 677
F.2d 834, 838 n.8 (11th Cir. 1982) (evidence of dog's training in drug detection
was enough to establish reliability of the dog).
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Often, courts are willing to accept assertions of the dog's training
and certification as prima facie evidence of a dog's accuracy. 96 An im-
proved practice would be for the reviewing court to make an indepen-
dent determination as to the adequacy of the training and the
legitimacy of the certification process in order to protect defendants
and require accountability of the government agency.9 7 If such a de-
termination is outside the court's expertise, canine units should be re-
quired to certify with an independent third party capable of assessing
and approving drug dogs at a level similar to the standards for other
scientific evidence.98
However, courts consistently refuse to examine the standards that
are used in the certification process, allowing police canine units to
utilize internal and private certification processes which have the po-
tential to be abused to the degree of using untrained dogs and fraudu-
96. United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996) ("We find that the infor-
mation contained in the affidavit in this case was sufficient to establish the train-
ing and reliability of the drug-detecting dog. The affidavit's references to the dog
as a 'drug sniffing or drug detecting dog' reasonably implied that the dog was a
'trained narcotics dog.' Further, the affidavit stated that the dog was trained and
qualified to conduct narcotics investigations .... Contrary to defendant's sugges-
tion, to establish probable cause, the affidavit need not describe the particulars of
the dog's training. Instead, the affidavit's accounting of the dog sniff indicating
the presence of controlled substances and its reference to the dog's training in
narcotics investigations was sufficient to establish the dog's training and reliabil-
ity."); see also Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007 (holding that an affidavit in support of a
search warrant need not describe the drug-detection dog's educational back-
ground and general qualifications with specificity to establish probable cause);
United States v. Stanley, 4 F. App'x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Assuming, without
deciding, that some evidence is necessary, we find Officer Amoia's testimony re-
garding his familiarity with the dog and its training sufficient to establish the
dog's reliability in this case."); Hunter, supra note 94, at 98-99 ("The lack of de-
fined standards means that a mere statement of the dog's training is trained is
[sic] generally sufficient. Therefore, a minimal burden of production on the pros-
ecution exists, making it difficult for the defense to challenge a prosecutor's
claims of reliability. If defined standards existed, they would provide a frame-
work upon which the defendant could challenge whether or not the particular
detector dog and handler team complied with established procedures and
requirements.").
97. See Bird, supra note 61, at 421 ("Reviewing judges should expect that a drug
detection dog graduated from a formalized program .... Courts should expect
that a training program includes much more than drug detection.").
98. Courts are reluctant to hold dog sniffs to the same strict requirements of a Frye
hearing demanded of scientific procedures. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(D) (3d ed. 2000) (citing People v.
Brooks, 950 P.2d 649, 652 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing the inapplicability of
Frye to dog-tracking evidence, the court stated that such evidence "does not in-
volve seemingly infallible scientific devices, processes, or theories."); People v.
Roraback, 662 N.Y.S.2d 327, 331 (App. Div. 1997) ("[Tlhere is no scientific princi-
ple or procedure at issue here. The use of a trained canine is an investigative
rather than a scientific procedure. Thus a Frye hearing was unnecessary.. ).
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lent certificates. 9 9 While some external, third-party certifications do
exist that could meet the requirements of most scientific research de-
mands, the absence of judicial concern for the certification process cre-
ates no incentive for canine units to undertake these expensive third-
party certifications.
In fact, the lack of concern has prompted one entrepreneur to cre-
ate a "do-it-yourself' manual to train drug dogs.10 0 The ability to
teach even the "amateur" to train a "certified" dog speaks volumes
with regards to the limited training actually performed by dog train-
ers. Of even greater concern is that the entrepreneur has concluded
that courts will not question his do-it-yourself training methods.
Russ Hess, the Executive Director of the United States Police Ca-
nine Association, "the oldest and largest organization to certify and
set standards for service dogs in the world," admits his program is
difficult, but also suggests that the stringent requirements are neces-
sary to provide an accurate assessment of a dog's capability. 10 1 His
concerns with other certification programs include pass/fail ratings for
dogs rather than accurate depictions of their performance. 10 2
There is no justification for the absence of a national uniform certi-
fication process for drug dogs as well as a national uniform certifica-
tion process for dog certifiers. At present, neither option exists
because courts are unwilling to inquire beyond the claim that a drug
dog is certified.
3. Handler Error
Handler error affects the accuracy of a dog. The relationship be-
tween a dog and its handler is the most important element in dog snif-
fing, providing unlimited opportunities for the handler to influence
the dog's behavior.X0 3 Dogs are animals, replete with animal tenden-
cies and instincts which the handler seeks to understand and control.
Even the best training cannot entirely control these instincts.1 0 4
There are two broad categories of handler error, both of which can
be intentional or inadvertent. A handler can cause an error by influ-
encing a dog's sniff or misconstruing a dog's reaction. A properly con-
ducted dog sniff will allow the dog to operate without any influence
99. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Woodford, supra note 68.
100. See http://www.hombecks.net (last visited Dec. 21, 2006).
101. Russ Hess, United States Police Canine Association, Certifications and the Use of
Force Continuum, http://www.uspcak9.com/pdf/ceritfication.pdf (last visited Dec.
21, 2006).
102. Id. at 2.
103. See Hunter, supra note 94, at 89 ("A detector dog requires a specially trained
handler in order to be effective.").
104. See Bird, supra note 61, at 422 ("A handler must be able to properly interpret a
canine's subtle signals. In fact, almost all erroneous alerts originate not from the
dog, but from the handler's misinterpretation of the dog's signals.").
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from its handler, sniffing a broad area for any odors it has been
trained to recognize. Such a search usually takes place very quickly,
with a fairly large area covered in a matter of seconds.
However, a trainer can influence a dog by causing it to linger over
an area for a longer period of time because the handler believes drugs
may be present.l0 5 Dogs are social creatures who want to please their
handlers. Dogs are trained to consider sniffing for contraband a fun
activity, rewarded with treats and praise when they are successful.
When a handler forces a dog to linger in an area longer than usual, the
dog can ascertain that the handler believes contraband may be pre-
sent and therefore alerts in an effort to please its handler. Such an
alert is both a product of the dog's training and nature along with the
handler's undue influence.1o 6
A drug dog is also susceptible to natural limitations that can be
accidentally misconstrued by a handler. A dog that is worked for too
long may be led to alert when in fact the dog is merely fatigued. The
dog's conduct which results from fatigue may be misconstrued as a
positive alert. The risk is particularly high if the drug dog is a passive
alert dog, a dog which alerts by sitting down or looking at its handler.
Studies suggest there is a natural limitation on the ability of the dogs
to sniff effectively.107
A dog is also extremely sensitive to the reactions of its handler, far
more than a handler may even realize. 1os Dogs can alert as a result of
a handler's change in behavior. The dog may pick up signals, such as
the handler holding his breath a little longer when he believes drugs
may be present, shifting his weight, or slightly altering his com-
mands.10 9 As a result of this unintentional behavior, the alert be-
comes less the product of the dog and more the product of the
handler's subconscious signals. This effect becomes more pronounced
when dogs are certified in closed situations where the handler is
aware of the location of drugs. For example, if the handler is responsi-
ble for placing a bag of marijuana in one of ten boxes, he is keenly
aware of its location. When he runs his drug dog among the boxes, his
subconscious cues could tip off the dog, resulting in a positive and ac-
105. Telephone Interview with Larry Myers, Assoc. Professor of Anatomy, Physiology
& Pharmacology, Coll. of Veterinary Sci., Auburn Univ. (Aug. 2, 2005).
106. Id.
107. U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 56; see also KELLY J. GARNE ET AL., AUBURN UNIV.,
INST. FOR BIOLOGICAL DETECTION Sys., DUTY CYCLE OF THE DETECTOR DOG: A
BASELINE STUDY (2001), http://www.vetmed.auburn.edulibds/pdf/dutycycle.pdf.
108. See Bird, supra note 61, at 424 ("Handlers must also know how to avoid 'handler
cues.' Handler cues are conscious or unconscious signals given from the handler
that can lead a detection dog to where the handler thinks drugs are located.
These voice or physical signals can compromise a dog's objectivity and impermis-
sibly lead the dog to alert at the suspected item or person.").
109. Telephone Interview with Larry Myers, supra note 105.
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curate alert. To eliminate this usurpation of the dog's ability to alert,
government agencies should train and test dogs in double blind situa-
tions. However, few agencies undertake such rigorous testing because
of the lack of judicial oversight resulting from the Place-Jacobsen
doctrine.110
An important part of a dog's training is that it continues to be
trained over time. It is necessary that a dog be trained continually in
order to both maintain accuracy and assess whether a dog continues
to be accurate as it gets older. Proper training requires several hours
per week to maintain accuracy, but many police units obtain certifica-
tion and fail to maintain training. Furthermore, when many police
units do continue training, drugs are placed in plausible locations eas-
ily located by a canine due to the repetitive nature of the exercise. The
better practice is to randomize locations for narcotics to assure that
dogs are being trained on their sense of smell rather than their mem-
ory of the previous exercises."1 l
The handler's interpretation of the dog's signal is not similar in
kind to the drug test in United States v. Jacobsen which could be pre-
served and replicated at a later time. The field test in Jacobsen was
repeated by a second group of federal agents to reduce the possibility
of error. Even the thermal scanner utilized in Kyllo produced an im-
age that allowed a judge to determine independently whether the im-
age established probable cause to grant the warrant. Unlike the
evidence in Jacobsen and Kyllo, the drug dog sniff occurs in a legal
vacuum where the handler determines if the dog alerts and then testi-
fies with certainty regarding the alert without any judicial oversight
or requirement to reproduce the results of the sniff. The current doc-
trine allows the police to circumvent the need for probable cause by
placing unquestioned reliance on the handler's testimony that a drug
dog alerted.
In United States v. Rivas,112 a federal court questioned a handler's
conclusion, a rare occurrence, that his dog alerted when it "cast" to the
defendant's truck. The court held that the cast did not constitute an
alert and ordered the cocaine suppressed. When pressed at the sup-
pression hearing, the customs agent that performed the search admit-
ted that the dog did not alert to the presence of narcotics but testified
that the dog cast a couple of times. A "cast" is when a dog does not
strongly alert but rather temporarily stops and spends additional time
at a certain point before continuing on its way.113 While the court
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 157 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998).
113. Id. at 368. In Rivas, the customs official testified that,
[flrom the points of entry that we have, the canines are assigned with
the dog handlers, our canines that are aggressive, alert, which means
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said that an alert provides probable cause for a search, it was unwill-
ing to extend that recognition to a "weak" alert or casting. 1 14 Han-
dlers may be testifying that the dog alerted when, in fact, the dog
merely paused or "cast." While this federal court actually questioned
the dog's sniff and surrounding circumstances, such an examination is
extremely rare. The lack of judicial oversight assures that handlers
can push the bounds of what constitutes an alert.
IV. THE HOME
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo v. United
States,115 several other courts had recognized a distinction when a
drug dog is used to detect contraband in a home, limiting United
States v. Place to objects outside of a home. Recognizing this distinc-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Thomas, reasoned that "a practice that is not intru-
sive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person's
home."116 The court explained why United States v. Place should not
be applied to homes:
Although using a dog sniff for narcotics may be discriminating and unoffen-
sive relative to other detection methods, and will disclose only the presence or
absence of narcotics, it remains a way of detecting the contents of a private,
enclosed space. With a trained dog police may obtain information about what
is inside a dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their own
that when they detect what they feel is the presence of narcotics in ei-
ther conveyance or baggage or whatever form it may be, the dog alerts to
it aggressively scratching at it or trying to bite at it. That's what we
term as aggressive alert. The phrase of "casting" is in a sense the dog
maybe feels not a strong alert, but something that temporarily stops him
and deters his attention at that point. And although he doesn't pursue as
aggressive alert, he does stop and give it minute attention and continues
with his duties by continuing his examination.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. ("We hold that, in this case, the government has not met its burden. The
government has not provided sufficient evidence that casting should always be
deemed equivalent to an alert as a matter of law. It did not put on any expert
testimony on what casting means, or what weight we should give it. The Cus-
toms official testified that he sought out the dog handler for his opinion as to why
the dog had cast the vehicle, but defense counsel properly objected to his answer
on the ground of hearsay. The government did not attempt to cure this lapse in
its evidence by putting on the dog handler. In fact, the only evidence the govern-
ment can rely on is the lay testimony by the Customs official that the difference
between an alert and a cast is the difference between scratching and biting at an
object, and temporarily stopping, giving part of the object 'minute attention' and
continuing with the inspection. If anything, this evidence suggests that casting is
too distantly related to an alert to create reasonable suspicion on its own as a
matter of law. We thus conclude that in this case, the government has not satis-
fied its burden of proving it had a reasonable suspicion when the dog cast at
Rivas' vehicle.").
115. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
116. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985).
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senses. Consequently, the officers' use of a dog is not a mere improvement of
their sense of smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant
enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instru-
ment. Here the defendant had a legitimate expectation that the contents of
his closed apartment would remain private, that they could not be "sensed"
from outside his door. Use of the trained dog impermissibly intruded on that
legitimate expectation.
1 1 7
The Washington Supreme Court approached this subject in a simi-
lar manner, adopting the rationale that "a dog sniff might constitute a
search if the object of the search or the location of the search were
subject to heightened constitutional protection."'" 8 This led a Wash-
ington Court of Appeals to hold that the use of a trained narcotics dog
on the garage of a home constituted an unreasonable search under
Washington's state constitution.
Like an infrared thermal detection device, using a narcotics dog goes beyond
merely enhancing natural human senses and, in effect, allows officers to "'see
through the walls' of the home." The record is clear that officers could not
detect the smell of marijuana using only their own sense of smell even when
they attempted to do so from the same vantage point as Corky. As in Young,
police could not have obtained the same information without going inside the
garage. It is true that a trained narcotics dog is less intrusive than an infra-
red thermal detection device. But the dog "does expose information that could
not have been obtained without the 'device'" and which officers were unable to
detect by using "one or more of [their] senses while lawfully present at the
vantage point where those senses are used." The trial court thus correctly
found that using a trained narcotics dog constituted a search for purposes of
article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution and a search warrant was
required. 1 1 9
A. Kyllo v. United States
In Kyllo v. United States, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the privileged position of the home in the Fourth Amend-
ment hierarchy: "'At the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable government intrusion.'"1 20 With broad statements that
117. Id. at 1366-67 (citation omitted). See also id. at 1367 ("The Supreme Court in
Place found only 'that the particular course of investigation that the agents in-
tended to pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a
public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a "search" within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.' Because of defendant Wheelings' heightened ex-
pectation of privacy inside his dwelling, the canine sniff at his door constituted a
search. As the agent had no warrant, the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Hence, we conclude that the information gathered from the dog's alert
may not properly be used to support the issuance of the search warrant of Wheel-
ings' apartment." (quoting United States v. Place, 464 U.S. 696, 707 (1982))).
118. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (Wash. 1994).
119. State v. Dearman, 962 P.2d 850, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Young, 867
P.2d at 597-98).
120. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
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all details about the inside of the home are intimate and therefore pri-
vate, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the warrant-
less use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from the
street to detect the relative heat loss from the house was an illegal
search. Now just five years later, Kyllo could be transformed from a
broad decree reinforcing the Fourth Amendment's protection of the
home, to a limited protection of the home from the use of relatively few
"not in general public use" high-tech devices. Just as the ringing en-
dorsement of individual privacy in Katz v. United States' 21 gave way
to a test that served to create limits on Fourth Amendment protection,
Kyllo stands to suffer a similar fate.
Kyllo arose when a U.S. Department of the Interior agent became
suspicious that marijuana was being grown inside Danny Kyllo's
home. Indoor growth of marijuana relies upon high-intensity lamps,
the presence of which may be inferred by measuring the amount of
heat emanating from the home. Thermal imagers detect infrared ra-
diation which is not visible to the naked eye, converting the radiation
into images based on relative warmth. The images demonstrated that
part of the roof and a wall in Kyllo's home were warm compared to the
rest of the house, and furthermore, that Kyllo's home was "substan-
tially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex" which had been
scanned for comparison purposes.1 22 The images led the agent to cor-
rectly infer that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home. Along
with utility bills and tips from informants, the images were presented
to a magistrate who issued a search warrant for Kyllo's home. The
search uncovered a growing operation of more than 100 marijuana
plants.123
The Kyllo majority opinion is premised upon two postulates: (1)
that the home is the repository of the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection, and (2) that advanced technological devices should be lim-
ited so that they do not erode the protection of the home to a level
below that which existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted
in 1791. The confusion caused by the Kyllo opinion is that it is unclear
whether Justice Scalia's emphasis was on protection of the home or
protection from high-tech devices, either of which results in the same
result in the case if used as the basis for the analysis. This lack of
clarity becomes critical when courts determine how to apply Kyllo to
drug dogs used to detect the presence of marijuana and other con-
trolled substances in the home.
121. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
122. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
123. Id.
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1. Kyllo as Protecting Privacy in the Home
Justice Scalia said that "[i]n the home, our cases show, all details
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes."124 Attempting to limit the protection to "intimate
details," Justice Scalia said in response to the dissent, "would not only
be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to
provide 'a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforce-
ment and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.'"12 5
Therefore, he concluded that everything within the home is an inti-
mate detail. This broad statement led the majority to reject the dis-
tinction offered in Justice Stevens' dissent between off-the-wall
technology, such as the thermal imager which only measures waste
escaping from the home, and through-the-wall technology, which al-
lows police to see into the home. Rather, Justice Scalia explained, the
distinction is meaningless because each method exposes the intimate
details of the home.
While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as tele-
phone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of
residences is at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of homes-the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-
there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. 
1 2 6
If Kyllo is primarily about protecting privacy in the home, it is dif-
ficult to justify a bright-line rule that distinguishes between some
forms of technology and drug dogs that lead to the discovery of mari-
juana in the same home. If all details within the home are intimate,
rendering the details of heat loss and the inference of marijuana inti-
mate in Kyllo, and therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment, then
the type of technology utilized should not be critical to the analysis.
The crucial consideration should be the location of the evidence rather
than the method utilized to discover it. Focusing on what is searched
for, as Justice Brennan said, "is fundamentally misguided and could
potentially lead to the development of a doctrine wholly at odds with
the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 127
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id. at 38 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).
126. Id. at 34.
127. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 136-37 ("Because the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply only to
'searches' and 'seizures,' an investigative technique that falls within neither cate-
gory need not be reasonable and may be employed without a warrant and without
probable cause, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its use. The prohibi-
tions of the Fourth Amendment are not, however, limited to any preconceived
conceptions of what constitutes a search or a seizure; instead we must apply the
constitutional language to modern developments according to the fundamental
principles that the Fourth Amendment embodies.").
[Vol. 85:735
CURBING THE DOG
2. State v. Rabb: Applying Kyllo to Drug Dogs
Rabb128 arose when the Broward County Sheriffs office received
information from a "confidential" source who wished to remain anony-
mous. Police initiated surveillance of the residence and then followed
John Brown when he departed from the home and drove to the high-
way. After observing Brown making an "an improper lane change"
and driving forty miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone, the
police officers initiated a traffic stop.129 While Brown was moving
across lanes to stop in the emergency stopping lane, the officers "ob-
served him placing his hands under the drivers [sic] seat and make
several overt motions."1 30 Once the vehicle stopped, Brown was or-
dered out of the car for officer safety. While he was exiting the car, the
officer observed "two cannabis cultivation books and one cannabis cul-
tivation video on the front drivers [sic] seat of the vehicle in plain
view."131
The officers proceeded to read Brown his rights, and he agreed to
answer their questions. When an officer asked him if he had a canna-
bis-growing operation inside the residence, Brown evaded the ques-
tion by telling the officer he was working on drywall in his home. The
officer then asked him about the books and video tape of cannabis cul-
tivation in the vehicle, and Brown responded "that he was just inter-
ested in cannabis cultivation."1 32
While the officers were questioning the defendant, a drug-detector
dog, "Chevy," alerted to the exterior of the vehicle. Chevy was then
placed in the interior of the vehicle, alerting to the ashtray. A canna-
bis cigarette was retrieved from the ashtray and field tested positive.
The defendant then asked to speak to a lawyer and the questioning
was terminated. As he was being arrested and placed into a sheriffs
car, the defendant admitted that he had additional cannabis in his left
shoe; the officers then removed two additional cannabis cigarettes
from his shoe.
Less than an hour later, the detective involved in the automobile
stop and Chevy walked up to the front door of the suspect's residence
where Chevy alerted. The affidavit seeking a search warrant indi-
cated that the "alert was consistent with previous alerts when narcot-
ics were located." 133 The affidavit also claimed that the detective and
128. State v. Rabb (Rabb I), 881 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 544
U.S. 1028 (2005).
129. Id. at 589.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 589-90. But see id. at 590 n.2 ("The affidavit indicated that the dog alerted
at the door of Rabb's residence. However, Detective Taranu testified that the dog
tugged as he was walking along the street.").
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another officer also "could smell the odor of cannabis emitting from
the residence."134 The dog alerted all along the street leading up to
Rabb's residence, a fact that should have called into question the dog's
accuracy in court. As the dog was in a continuously heightened state,
it was at the officer's complete discretion to determine that the dog
was alerting to Rabb's home as opposed to any other home along the
street. Although Rabb is now clearly a dog sniff case, the dog alert to
the home should not even have been essential to obtaining the war-
rant: the officer testified that he was able to smell marijuana emanat-
ing from the residence from his legal vantage point, rendering the
dog's involvement extraneous.
The state sought and was granted a search warrant for the resi-
dence based upon the tip, the materials found in the vehicle and on
defendant's person, and the dog alert on the residence. The search of
the residence turned up a grow operation and sixty-four cannabis
plants. A search of a safe found in the house also produced two
MDMA tablets, Aprazolam tablets, and three cannabis cigarettes.
Within the safe they also found identification evidence identifying the
arrestee as James Rabb, not John Brown.13 5
The trial court granted the motion to suppress concluding that "the
use of the dog sniff of Rabb's house amounted to a warrantless search
and could not support the issuance of the subsequent search warrant
for Rabb's house." 136 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed, distin-
guishing United States v. Place.
In Place, the United States Supreme Court was not addressing the use of law
enforcement investigatory techniques at a house, but rather only whether a
dog sniff of luggage in a public airport constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. The role of "place" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was in-
strumental in the decision in Place. 13 7
The court continued with its play on words: "'Place' is no less key
in the case at bar."138 The court keyed in on the special "constitu-
tional protections afforded a house throughout the long history of the
Fourth Amendment"13 9 and concluded:
134. Id. at 590.
135. Id.
136. Id. ("The trial court then undertook to determine whether there was sufficient
lawfully obtained evidence to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant
for Rabb's house without the dog sniff, and concluded that there was not where
'[tihere was no indicia of a marijuana grow house, i.e., covered windows, high
pedestrian traffic, higher than normal use of electricity, etc.,' the informant's ve-
racity was not established in the affidavit, and the marijuana in Rabb's car did
not establish any illegal activities in his house.").
137. Id. at 592.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 591 ("Given the shroud of protection wrapped around a house by the Fourth
Amendment, we conclude that Kyllo v. United States controls the outcome of the
case at bar." (citiation omitted)). See also id. at 592 ("In United States v. Thomas,
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[Wie hold that the trial court did not err by granting Rabb's motion to sup-
press where the marijuana seized was initially discovered by a dog sniff at the
exterior of his house. Based on the reasonable expectation of privacy recog-
nized by both law and society to be associated with a house, law enforcement's
use of the dog sniff without a warrant constituted a search that was not per-
mitted by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, absent the dog sniff, there
was no independent lawful evidence establishing probable cause to issue a
warrant, irremediably tainting the evidence obtained by the search of Rabb's
house based on an invalid warrant. As a result, we affirm.
1 4 0
The United States Supreme Court was not convinced. The Court,
without a single dissenter, summarily reversed the Florida court and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Illinois v.
Caballes.14 1 Perhaps most puzzling, or possibly most revealing, is the
Court's summary handling of the case without fully considering the
continued viability of Place and Caballes, and the myths upon which
the legal conclusion in Place rests, especially when the focus of the dog
sniff is a home, the repository of the highest level of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Summarily reversing the case without opinion and
with only a citation to Caballes is logically backward. This is a major
Fourth Amendment decision affecting protection of the home. When
narrowing the amendment's protection, the Court's justification for
the erosion should be explained rather than merely citing to a case
pertaining to an automobile where Fourth Amendment protection is
least protected. The arguments in favor of allowing suspicionless dog
sniffs of a vehicle have little relevance to a subject more historically
protected, such as the home.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Florida
Court of Appeal pushed back and determined, again, that Kyllo v.
United States, rather than Caballes, "controls the outcome of the case
at bar."14 2 The court concluded:
The use of the dog, like the use of a thermal imager, allowed law enforcement
to use sense-enhancing technology to intrude into the constitutionally-pro-
tected area of Rabb's house, which is reasonably considered a search violative
of Rabb's expectation of privacy in his retreat. Likewise, it is of no importance
that a dog sniff provides limited information regarding only the presence or
absence of contraband, because as in Kyllo, the quality or quantity of informa-
tion obtained through the search is not the feared injury. Rather, it is the fact
that law enforcement endeavored to obtain the information from inside the
757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit compared the dog sniff of
luggage in Place with that of an apartment, and concluded that 'a practice that is
not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person's
home.' The rationale for this conclusion is that 'the defendant had a legitimate
expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would remain private, that
they could not be "sensed" from outside his door. Use of the trained dog impermis-
sibly intruded on that legitimate expectation.'").
140. Id. at 595-96.
141. Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005).
142. State v. Rabb (Rabb 11), 920 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 665 (2006).
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house at all, or in this case, the fact that a dog's sense of smell crossed the
"firm line" of Fourth Amendment protection at the door of Rabb's house. Be-
cause the smell of marijuana had its source in Rabb's house, it was an "inti-
mate detail" of that house, no less so than the ambient temperature inside
Kyllo's house. Until the United States Supreme Court indicates otherwise,
therefore, we are bound to conclude that the use of a dog sniff to detect contra-
band inside a house does not pass constitutional muster. The dog sniff at the
house in this case constitutes an illegal search.143
Then the court explained why the use of a drug dog on a home is anal-
ogous to the use of the thermal imager in Kyllo:
The use of dogs for investigation is a longstanding practice, but "the officers'
use of a dog is not a mere improvement of their sense of smell, as ordinary
eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a
different, and far superior, sensory instrument." Likewise, "thermal imagers
detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visi-
ble to the naked eye." Although a drug detector dog's sense of smell may not
be man-made, electronic technology, like the Agema Thermovision 210, its use
might allow law enforcement to detect that which it otherwise could not detect
with unaided human senses. Relying on Kyllo, we conclude that although the
use of such sensory enhancement techniques to detect contraband subse-
quently seized by warrant may not amount to a search in a place such as a
public airport, it does when intruding into a house to discern "intimate
details."1
4 4
Faced with the Florida Court of Appeal's resistance to the dictate that
the case would be resolved simply by reference to Caballes, the United
143. Id. at 1184.
144. Id. at 1184-85 (citations omitted). See also id. at 1190-91 ("The dissent inter-
prets Caballes much like it interprets Place, to stand for the proposition that a
binary search, which reveals only the presence or absence of contraband, is never
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. This analysis is flawed and
disturbing for two reasons. The first reason highlights the fundamental philo-
sophical divide between the majority and the dissent in this case-in order to
determine whether a search has occurred, we determine whether the place at
which the search occurred was subject to a legitimate expectation of privacy
while the dissent measures whether the item searched for was subject to a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy. It is clear from the jurisprudential history of the
Fourth Amendment that it is always considered in reference to a place. Further-
more, a slippery slope portends peril for privacy if the item searched for is the
measuring stick. If determining whether law enforcement conduct constitutes a
search is solely a function of whether the item searched for is illegal, whether
that item be in a vehicle on a public highway or beyond the closed doors of an
individual's castle, the Fourth Amendment is rendered meaningless. Nothing
would deter law enforcement from marching a dog up to the doors of every house
on a street hoping the dog sniffs drugs inside. If drugs are detected, then no
search has occurred because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in drugs
and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated; if drugs are not detected, then law
enforcement cannot charge the individual with a crime and the unfounded search
goes undeterred. Such an "ends justifies the means" approach to the Fourth
Amendment is simply not what the Founders intended when they embodied a
barrier at the door of the home in the Fourth Amendment.").
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States Supreme Court elected not to reconsider the case when the
state sought the Court's intervention a second time.145
3. Fitzgerald v. State: Kyllo Inapplicable to Dog Sniff of Home
The Maryland Court of Appeals also recognized the difference be-
tween a canine sniff of a package at an airport or of an automobile and
that of the home but anticipated the Supreme Court's initial result in
Rabb: "[Hiowever, we see no difference in their relationship to the
Fourth Amendment. A K-9 scan alone constitutes neither an intru-
sive search in the traditional sense nor a seizure and thus, there are
few Fourth Amendment implications."146 Consequently, the court
concluded that "Place [is] applicable to dog sniffs in general, indepen-
dent of the object searched, because of the sniffs' narrow scope."147
Police became suspicious of Fitzgerald in 2002 when information
was received from an anonymous source that Fitzgerald and his girl-
friend "regularly sold a high quality grade marijuana called 'Kind
Bud,"' that they lived together in an apartment, and that they drove a
pick-up truck.14s The police investigation confirmed the address
where the couple lived and that Fitzgerald had a juvenile record for
distribution of marijuana along with three burglaries.
The police brought a drug dog to the apartment house where Fitz-
gerald lived. The specific drug dog was trained to sniff for contraband
and some items that could be legally possessed, such as Diazepam, a
generic form of the prescription drug Valium. 149 In the common hall-
way of the apartment house, the dog was led to scan four apartments,
alerting only to Fitzgerald's. The court described an odd form of
alert,150 which should have called the dog sniff into question.151
Shortly thereafter, the anonymous source notified the police again, al-
leging that Fitzgerald continued to sell "Kind Bud marijuana." A
search warrant issued on this information led to the discovery of mari-
juana and other evidence of marijuana use and distribution.
Relying upon Place's determination that a dog is sui generis and
Jacobsen's determination that a test only to determine whether white
powder was cocaine revealed nothing about noncontraband items, the
145. Florida v. Rabb, 127 S. Ct. 665 (2006).
146. Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1012 (Md. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420, 436 n.20 (Md. 2001)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1008.
149. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
150. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1008 n.2 ("At the suppression hearing, Officer Brian testi-
fied about how Alex communicates his detection of contraband: 'Okay. What Alex
does is he sits there and I present to him, he sits there in that area, and what he
does is he'll sit and he looks at me and that is his indication to me that he smells
the presence of a narcotic."').
151. See supra note 104.
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court held that a drug dog does not intrude upon Fourth Amendment
protected privacy because a holder of contraband can have no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in contraband.15 2 The court then con-
cluded that "[e]ven a perfunctory reading of Kyllo reveals that its
standard does not apply to dog sniffs. Kyllo is an opinion about the
need to limit 'advancing technology."'153
With this review of Kyllo, it is clear that Kyllo has no bearing on dog sniffs.
First, a dog is not technology-he or she is a dog. A dog is known commonly as
"man's best friend." Across America, people consider dogs as members of their
family. The same cannot be said of cars, blenders, or thermal imagers.
1 5 4
4. The Supreme Court Fails to Bark When Considering Sniffs of
the Home
The Supreme Court's reversal of Rabb cites to Caballes for the pro-
position that a dog sniff of a car is not a search, apparently signaling
the applicability of that conclusion to a home. Caballes in turn relied
upon Place and Jacobsen. The notion that a dog sniff is not a search
emanated in Place although it was dictum and not central to the out-
come of the case. 15 5 Place was extended, as expected, to automobiles
in Caballes, and now seemingly to homes in Rabb. Secondary support
in Caballes was found to exist in Jacobsen.
Caballes adopted the broadest reading of Place: that "the use of a
well-trained narcotics-detection dog-one that 'does not expose non-
contraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view,'.., generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests."156
Thus, the Court concluded again that the canine sniff is sui generis.
The sui generis label rests upon the following three rationales: (1) that
the procedure is accurate, (2) that the procedure does not disclose
anything protected under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) that the
procedure is a limited intrusion that "does not rise to the level of a
152. Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1017.
153. Id. at 1015.
154. Id.
155. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
156. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707). See
also Place, 462 U.S. at 707 ("We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. A 'canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however,
does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items
that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an
officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in
which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells
the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information ob-
tained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the prop-
erty is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.").
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constitutionally cognizable infringement."'157 We explained in Part III
how none of the three rationales fit.
By seemingly extending Place and Caballes to the home, the Court
has engaged in a sleight-of-hand trick unworthy of an amateur magi-
cian. Without explanation, the Court has extended a doctrine that
was unsupported at its inception in Place and not supported in Cabal-
les when extended to automobiles. Now, in a summary reversal, it is
extended to homes.
It is possible that we have misread Rabb and it stands for some-
thing other than extension of Place and Caballes to the home, but at-
tempting to figure out what else it could stand for is a fairly hopeless
exercise. The cryptic summary reversal accompanied by the reference
to Caballes leaves few plausible alternatives. Perhaps the Court was
signaling that the lower court had misread Caballes. However, such a
conclusion makes no sense. Neither the Florida trial nor appellate
courts questioned the legality of allowing a canine unit to sniff inside
the lawfully stopped vehicle. The courts, however, ruled that the evi-
dence of a small quantity of marijuana in the vehicle and on the defen-
dant's person, coupled with books in the vehicle about cannabis
cultivation, was not enough, without the dog sniff of the residence, to
give probable cause to justify issuance of the search warrant for the
house. Perhaps the Supreme Court differed with the state courts'
probable-cause analysis, but if that is the basis for the summary re-
versal, the citation to Caballes is meaningless and provides no gui-
dance whatsoever. The only relevant factor remaining is the state
trial and appellate courts' conclusion that the warrantless dog sniff of
the home was an illegal search which could not serve as the basis for
the subsequent search warrant. If the Supreme Court differed with
that conclusion, its reference to Caballes must stand for the proposi-
tion that a dog sniff-even of a home-is not a search. As set forth in
the next section, such an interpretation reduces Kyllo to little more
than an empty shell.
B. The Impact of Rabb on Kyllo
If Rabb extends the Place-Caballes doctrine to the home, which
seems to be the necessary conclusion of the Court's summary reversal,
it cuts the heart out of Kyllo and reduces Justice Scalia's peroration
about the home to little more than a rhetorical flourish. If true, Kyllo
becomes merely an extension of Fourth Amendment protection for the
home when the police employ advanced technological devices not gen-
erally available to the public.
Yet Kyllo seemed to offer so much more. Justice Scalia's rejection
of the technology used in Kyllo because it was capable of disclosing,
157. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
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"for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath,"158 was hyperbolic simply to stress that all de-
tails of the home are intimate and deserving of protection: "[0]ur cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes."' 59
The Rabb Court's apparent extension of Caballes to the home ren-
ders the supposedly unbending protection described in Kyllo meaning-
less. The primary focus becomes what the police are seeking rather
than that they are seeking it from within a home. In deciding that the
need to locate contraband outweighs the traditional protection ac-
corded the home that Justice Scalia extols in Kyllo, the Rabb decision
indicates a situational and inconsistent enforcement of Fourth
Amendment rights by the Supreme Court. The fears that Justice
Scalia voiced about future technology which will be able to see through
walls, rather than read off-the-wall data as the thermal imager did in
Kyllo, will be realized when an imaging device which only identifies a
controlled substance is developed. By rejecting the distinction be-
tween off-the-wall and through-the-wall technology offered by Justice
Stevens' dissent in Kyllo, Justice Scalia seemed to want to draw the
line around the outside of the home, long before the possibility of
through-the-wall technology exists, in order to provide substantive di-
rection for future law enforcement and to create a prophylaxis to pro-
tect familial privacy in the home. How should courts reconcile this
principle with the opposing principle that a device which only mea-
sures the presence or absence of contraband is not a search? Such a
contest might result in reducing Kyllo to protecting only against the
newest high-tech device until it is generally available, and even may
allow its use in its infancy if the technology only identifies the pres-
ence or absence of contraband. 160
Under the Supreme Court's standard, the more sui generis, high-
tech thermal imager would be unavailable, but the low-tech, less accu-
rate dog sniff would be an option for law enforcement. If the reasona-
ble innocent person who possesses no contraband in her home were
given the choice between the thermal imager and the dog, the choice
would be simple-she would choose the high-tech device that is much
less likely to create a false positive leading to a search, the device
which the police may not use.
158. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
159. Id. at 37.
160. Another possible alternative analysis is that the Court in Rabb did not dispute
the Florida court's conclusion that a dog sniff of a home is a Fourth Amendment
intrusion but did disagree with the Florida court's conclusion that such an intru-
sion does not require a search warrant. However, the Supreme Court's reference
to Caballes does not lend support for such an interpretation.
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After the Kyllo decision, a federal district court in Indiana con-
cluded that Kyllo validated the Second Circuit's holding in Thomas.
The court in United States v. Jackson 161 held that police use of a drug-
sniffing dog at the door of a suspect's residence was a search that re-
quired probable cause and a search warrant. 16 2 The court went on to
point out the full implications of the government's argument in the
case:
Under the government's theory in this case, the police would be free to walk
drug-sniffing dogs from door to door through a neighborhood, and to obtain a
search warrant for any home where the dog indicated an odor of a controlled
substance. And of course, a top-to-bottom search of a home for controlled sub-
stances, which can be concealed almost anywhere, can be an extremely thor-
ough intrusion into a home. When one keeps in mind the fact that the police
reported that the dog in question here alerted to a vehicle and the home, and
that both were searched without finding a trace of controlled substances, the
potential for abusive and unreasonable searches is especially evident.
1 6 3
The district court in Jackson even attempted to apply the technology
analysis of Kyllo to the drug dog:
This reasoning applies directly to the "sense-enhancing" use of a specially
trained dog. Dogs with such training are not in "general public use" (which
refers to the general public, not to police forces, which often use such dogs to
detect drugs). The information such a dog can provide about the interior of
the home would not otherwise be obtained without a physical intrusion into
the home. The court sees no constitutional distinction between the use of spe-
cially trained dogs and sophisticated electronics from outside a home to detect
activities in or contents of the home's interior. 164
The Jackson court attempted to provide the judicial protection of
Fourth Amendment rights sought by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
Jacobsen,165 but the Jackson court's general and specific analyses
clearly did not resonate with the Supreme Court. The Court's cryptic
decision in Rabb seems to authorize police to walk drug dogs near
every home and through every apartment house without any predi-
cate, exposing Americans in their homes to police surveillance and to
full searches of those homes based upon accurate alerts, false alerts,
or alerts to substances that are not inherently contraband, substances
which may or may not be legally possessed.
V. DOG SNIFFING OF SCHOOLCHILDREN
An integral part of America's war on drugs the past thirty years
has been the country's war on its children. Drug dogs, though only
one tool in the arsenal of that war, have been an important and fre-
quently used weapon. American society only seems to question such
161. No. IP 03-79-CR-1H/F, 2004 WL 1784756 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004).
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id. at *3.
165. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tactics when we are informed of an egregious incident where overzeal-
ous school administrators and police officers, in an attempt to crack-
down on a perceived drug problem, engage in conduct which is so
extreme that it is completely disproportional to the existing problem it
seeks to remedy. Drugs are a serious issue in our schools; however, by
extension, existing case law permits police and administrators to sub-
ject all students to exposure to sniffing and pawing dogs which should
be reserved for only those where at least reasonable suspicion exists,
or for all in only a true emergency situation.
One such incident occurred on November 5, 2003, when police
staged a drug raid at the Stratford High School in Goose Creek, South
Carolina. Police burst into the school with guns drawn and forced stu-
dents to the floor, handcuffing some, while drug dogs sniffed the stu-
dents' backpacks, lockers, and bodies for contraband. A school
surveillance camera showed police waving their guns at students who
were lying face down on the floor. Although police and school adminis-
trators continued to justify its necessity after the fact, no drugs or
weapons were found during the raid.16 6 Obviously, the drug dogs
were only one factor in the Goose Creek story, and more details will be
forthcoming as a result of class action civil rights suits filed after the
raid. Goose Creek, however, is only the most recent egregious exam-
ple of the widespread use of drug dogs sniffing not only inanimate ob-
jects in and around schools such as vehicles and lockers, but of
students' persons.
A. The Existing Law
The Supreme Court has yet to specifically address the use of drug
dogs on schoolchildren. The existing law has been evolving for over a
quarter of a century but remains opaque enough to offer support for
both sides of the issue. Even before the Supreme Court's unsupported
dictum in United States v. Place that a dog sniff does not qualify as a
search was assumed applicable to a spectrum of subjects, the issue of
drug dogs being used in schools was already emerging. The Supreme
Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in 1981 in Doe v. Ren-
frow,167 a federal civil rights law suit arising out of the use of trained
German Shepherds who sniffed the bodies of each student, leaving in
place the Seventh Circuit's decision upholding the practice. 168 Before
the practice of dog sniffing was exempted from Fourth Amendment
coverage in Place, the Seventh Circuit's decision made it abundantly
166. See School Drug Raid Causes Uproar, supra note 8; Drug Raid at S.C. High
School, CBS NEWS, Nov. 7, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/07/na-
tional/main582492.shtml.
167. 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
168. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1022 (1981).
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clear that the Fourth Amendment's protection is mitigated in the
classroom.
Renfrow was not dominated by the extreme violence that perme-
ated the Goose Creek raid in 2003, but the facts are sufficiently troub-
ling. Six teams composed of a school administrator along with a
police-trained German Shepherd, its handler, and two uniformed of-
ficers conducted simultaneous raids on the junior and senior high
schools in Highland, Indiana, a community not far from Chicago. The
raids took place at the end of the first period, and students were or-
dered to remain seated in their first period classroom. They were re-
quired to remain seated for two and a half hours (an additional one
and a half hours after the class ended) with their belongings in view
and their hands on the desk. The students were not allowed to use the
restrooms during this period unaccompanied. Police officers and
school administrators patrolled the halls preventing students from
leaving the schoolhouse. Media representatives were invited in and
permitted to watch what unfolded, exacerbating the public nature of
the process for students subjected to the raid.16 9
Justice Brennan, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, wrote
that "[wihile school officials acting in loco parentis may take reasona-
ble steps to maintain a safe and healthful educational environment,
their actions must nonetheless be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment."170
Justice Brennan reported that "[tihe dogs were led up and down
each aisle of the classroom from desk to desk, and from student to
student. Each student was probed, sniffed, and inspected by at least
one of the fourteen German shepherds detailed to the school."171 Jus-
tice Brennan then elaborated on the experience:
When the search team assigned to petitioner's classroom reached petitioner,
the police dog pressed forward, sniffed at her body, and repeatedly pushed its
nose and muzzle into her legs. The uniformed officer then ordered petitioner
to stand and empty her pockets, apparently because the dog "alerted" to the
presence of drugs. However, no drugs were found. After petitioner emptied
her pockets, the dog again sniffed her body and again it apparently "alerted."
Petitioner was then escorted to the nurse's office for a more thorough physical
inspection.
Petitioner was met at the nurse's office by two adult women, one a uni-
formed police officer. After denying that she had ever used marihuana, peti-
tioner was ordered to strip. She did so, removing her clothing in the presence
of the two women. The women then looked over petitioner's body, inspected
her clothing, and touched and examined the hair on her head. 1 7 2
No drugs were found, and the girl was allowed to dress and return
to class. Apparently, the drug dog alerted to petitioner because she
169. See Renfrow, 451 U.S. at 1023 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1022.
171. Id. at 1023.
172. Id. at 1023-24.
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had been playing earlier that morning with her own dog that was in
heat.1 73 The dogs alerted to more than fifty students during the raid,
but only fifteen high school students and no middle school students
actually possessed drugs or drug paraphernalia, a less than forty-per-
cent accuracy rate. Five high school students (three boys and two
girls) were strip searched. Four middle school girls were strip
searched, and no contraband was found. 17 4
The district court held that requiring the students to remain in the
classroom an additional hour and a half was not a seizure, and that
the entry of school officials into the classrooms accompanied by the
drug dogs and police officers was not a search. 175 Even if the stu-
dents' continued presence in the room was required by school attend-
ance rules, they certainly had no option but to submit to the dog sniff;
they could not refuse to cooperate, which is the Fourth Amendment
standard when leaving is not an option even though not imposed by
police. 17 6 The court analogized the presence of the dogs in the class-
room to an administrator coming into the room for the purpose of ob-
serving a class. 1 77 Suggesting the equivalency is to ignore the fact
that one of the two situations carries the specter of being pawed and
poked by a German Shepherd.
The dog acted merely as an aide to the school administrator in detecting the
scent of marijuana. The dog handler interpreted the actions of the dog for the
benefit of the school administrator. Bringing these nonschool personnel into
the classroom to aid the school administrators in their observation for drug
abuse is, of itself, not a search. ... The presence of the canine team for several
minutes was a minimal intrusion at best and not so serious as to invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.
1 7 8
173. Id. at 1024 n.1.
174. Id. at 1022.
175. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("[Tlhe presence of the
uniformed police officer in the room, at the request of the school official and with
the agreement that no arrests would occur as a result of finding any drugs upon
students, did not alter the basic function of the school official's activities" in act-
ing under the in loco parentis doctrine.).
176. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (employees who were subject to INS
questioning about their immigration status were not detained even though they
were not free to leave because of work rules; however, the agents' conduct gave
the employees no "reason to believe that they would be detained if... they simply
refused to answer").
177. See Jennifer Bradfield, Comment, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Step
Toward Upholding Suspicionless Dog Sniff Searches in Public Schools?, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 475, 501-02 (1997) ("The Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. Renfrow, is the
only circuit to have held that dog sniffs of schoolchildren are not searches. In
Renfrow, the court reasoned that the presence of the dog and its trainer, at the
request of school officials, served merely to aid the school administrator in de-
tecting the scent of marijuana. In addition, the court reasoned that public school
students experience various intrusions into their classroom environment, and the
presence of the dogs for a few minutes was a minimal intrusion and therefore not
significant enough to invoke the Fourth Amendment." (footnotes omitted)).
178. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1020.
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Furthermore, the court held that the dog sniffing did not violate the
protected privacy interest of the thirteen-year-old student because (1)
"this was not a police action," (2) "students do not have a justifiable
expectation of privacy that would preclude a school administrator
from sniffing the air around the desks with the aid of a trained drug
detecting canine," (3) "students in a public school do[ I not fall within
the meaning of Katz because of the very nature of public school educa-
tion,"179 and (4) "[a]ny expectation of privacy necessarily diminishes
in light of a student's constant supervision while in school."180 In
summary, the court concluded that a reasonable right to inspection is
necessary to the school's performance of its duty to provide an educa-
tional environment and overcomes a student's very limited Fourth
Amendment interests.'18 The Seventh Circuit affirmed and accepted
the reasons given in the district court's "scholarly opinion" which the
court "adopted as [its] own." 18 2 Dissenting Judge Swygert concluded
that the majority's description of what happened was too benign be-
cause all 2,780 students at the school were subjected "to a humiliating
search by police dogs."183
179. But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) ("Although this Court may
take notice of the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today,
the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate
expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain
order in a prison is such that prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy in their cells, but it goes almost without saying that '[tihe prisoner and the
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts
of criminal conviction and incarceration.' We are not yet ready to hold that the
schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
180. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
181. Id. Note, however, that the district court held that the strip search of the student
on the continued alert of the drug dog after the student emptied her pockets was
unreasonable. Id. at 1024-25.
182. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1022 (1981).
183. Doe v. Renfrow, 635 F.2d 582, 583 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("The cases cited by the district court as holding that
sniffing dogs do not constitute a search are totally inapposite because in those
cases the dogs were sniffing inanimate and unattended objects rather than peo-
ple. Here the intrusive probings by the dogs were in no sense mere observation of
'"physical characteristics .. . constantly exposed to the public," . . . [but] consti-
tuted the type of"severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal secur-
ity" that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.' We need not speculate afar about
the psychological trauma suffered by the students during this mass search. The
accusing finger of the police may well remain for a lifetime upon these young,
impressionable minds. Had a warrant properly been sought, I am convinced that
none could have issued consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The police and
school officials neither possessed nor attempted to gain specific information about
any particular student. There was also no information as to any particular drug
or contraband transaction or event. Thus, all 2,780 students were under suspi-
cion, and there was no known crime. A search under these conditions is unconsti-
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The opposite position was taken by the Fifth Circuit in Horton v.
Goose Creek Independent School District, in 1982.184 The school dis-
trict, concerned about a growing drug and alcohol abuse culture in its
schools, contracted with a security services firm that specialized in
providing Doberman Pinschers and German Shepherds "trained to
alert their handlers to the presence of any one of approximately sixty
different substances, including alcohol and drugs," including over-the-
counter and controlled substances.1 8 5 The school district informed el-
ementary, junior, and senior high school students about the impend-
ing use of the dogs, calling into question whether they actually hoped
to find any substances in the first place, which raises even more seri-
ous questions about the purpose of the exercise.
The dogs were taken to schools throughout the district on a ran-
dom and unannounced basis where they sniffed student lockers and
automobiles. The dogs were also taken "into the classrooms, on
leashes, to sniff the students themselves."' 8 6 If the dog alerted its
handler to the odor of a specific substance on a student's body, that
student, after the dog had departed, was "asked" to leave the class and
proceed to the administrator's office where the student was searched,
although not strip searched. Two of the named plaintiffs triggered
alerts. School officials questioned Sandra Sanchez and then rum-
maged through her purse without her consent. They found a small
bottle of perfume in the purse which they returned to her. Robby Hor-
ton was told to empty his pockets; nothing incriminating was found.
School officials then searched his socks and lower pants legs, again
finding nothing.
The court of appeals held the dog sniffing of the student lockers
and automobiles, objects that were unattended and in public view, not
to be a search. However, directly contradicting the "situationally miti-
gated" interpretation of the Fourth Amendment offered by the Sev-
enth Circuit, the court reasoned that the dog sniff of the students was
a search.
The use of dogs to sniff the students, however, presents an entirely differ-
ent problem.... [T]he dogs in the GCISD program put their noses right up
against the children's bodies. ...
The students' persons certainly are not the subject of lowered expectations
of privacy. On the contrary, society recognizes the interest in the integrity of
tutional under either a reasonable suspicion or a probable cause standard."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
184. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982). This case is not to be confused with the situation
that occurred in the town of Goose Creek, South Carolina, mentioned above. It is
merely an odd coincidence that the school district involved here and the town in
South Carolina are both named "Goose Creek."
185. Id. at 474. See discussion of non-contraband items supra note 66.
186. Id.
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one's person, and the fourth amendment applies with its fullest vigor against
any intrusion on the human body.187
In 1999, Horton was endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in B.C. v.
Plumas Unified School District,1 8 8 an especially interesting case be-
cause the facts are devoid of all violence and physical contact. The
students of Quincy High School were required to exit their classrooms
while walking past a drug-sniffing dog and its police handler stationed
outside each classroom door. The dog, Keesha, alerted to one of the
students. The students were required to remain outside while the dog
sniffed their belongings which the students were required to leave in-
side the classroom. After their belongings were subjected to the dog
sniff, the students returned to the classroom once again passing by the
dog, who again alerted to the same student. The student was removed
from the classroom and searched. No drugs were found on that stu-
dent or any other student. The facts recited by the court indicate that
Keesha never physically touched the students as they passed in and
out of the classroom.
Reasoning that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit
had directly addressed the issue of whether a dog sniff of a person is a
search, the court relied upon its own 1984 precedent which recognized
that the level of intrusiveness is greater when the dog is permitted to
sniff a person than when a dog sniffs unattended luggage.18 9 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Horton that "close prox-
imity sniffing of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine
or human,"19o concluding that "[b]ecause we believe that the dog sniff
at issue in this case infringed B.C.'s reasonable expectation of privacy,
we hold that it constitutes a search."19 1
Having decided that the dog sniff of a person is a search, the court
went on to determine the reasonableness of that search and held that
"the random and suspicionless dog sniff search of B.C. was unreasona-
ble under the circumstances."192 The court reached that conclusion by
balancing the nature and extent of the intrusion against the govern-
mental interest sought to be advanced by the intrusion. Relying upon
the district court's finding that the dog sniff was highly intrusive and
that the record did not disclose that there was a drug problem, let
alone a drug crisis, at Quincy High School, the court concluded that
the search was unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the court did not jump immediately to the conclu-
sion that a warrant based upon probable cause was the constitutional
187. Id. at 477-78 (footnote omitted).
188. 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
190. Plumas Unified, 192 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Horton, 690 F.2d at 479).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1268.
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requirement, but indicated instead that reasonableness is a variable
standard, and if the government interest is very high, for example if
there were indications of a bomb plot or a "drug crisis" at Quincy High
School, it might be reasonable to engage in random, suspicionless dog
sniffs of the students. Absent such conditions, the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness standard should demand more.
The practice of alerting students to an impending raid must be ad-
dressed, as it is both counterproductive on its own terms from one
standpoint, and assures that the search is entirely gratuitous and
therefore vindictive subjugation from another. While some may opine
that the practice is more humane, allowing students to save them-
selves from a positive alert in school, the argument fails on its own
terms as it does nothing other than stop students from bringing drugs
to school that day or week.
The underlying hope behind conducting the raids should be to alert
administrators to students' drug problems and providing help to them,
whether it is through internal or external assistance programs. Evi-
dence of this intent is provided as schools will often provide immunity
to students who are willing to voluntarily relinquish their contraband
moments before the raid, offering to treat the problem internally
rather than involve law enforcement. Schools should be commended
for their commitment to the reform of their students when offering
such protection before an immediately ensuing raid.
However, if the administration actually intends to find drugs, al-
erting the students to the impending raid days before practically as-
sures that drugs will not be found. The cynical view of this type of
warning is two-fold: the desire to reduce paperwork for the school and
the desire to be able to report that the school is drug free to the com-
munity. Drug raids that are successful in discovering drugs inevitably
provide bad press for schools; eliminating that possibility is a positive
for everyone involved-everyone, of course, except the child who might
benefit from the discovery of a suspected drug problem.
While the early warning may assure that drugs are not found on
the students, it does not eliminate both the humiliation and fear the
students suffer when subjected to the sniff of a drug dog. In fact, the
humiliation and fear are the only actual products of a drug raid in-
tended to fail in its discovery of contraband. The student is still sub-
jected to a dog sniff; the dog may still falsely alert, and the student
may still be subjected to a further search. In a drug raid intended to
find nothing, the only remaining motivations are pure malice and good
press, neither of which could meet the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment if the dog sniff of a person was deemed a
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search. 19 3 However, as the Court continues its expansion of the Place
doctrine, it permits administrators to continue this malicious practice
without the judicial oversight provided by the Fourth Amendment.
B. Arriving at a General Rule Pertaining to Dog Sniffs of
Schoolchildren
Any reliance on United States v. Place to create a general rule that
dog sniffing is not a search is misplaced. First, the discussion of dog
sniffing in Place was gratuitous, never challenged by the defendant,
never raised in the courts below, and not briefed by the parties. The
discussion of the dog sniff was not necessary to the outcome of the
case. In the absence of full preparation on this issue, the Court in
Place made general comments about the nature and accuracy of dog
sniffing which have been consistently repeated but which are not
accurate.194
Most importantly, Place involved the dog sniff of an inanimate ob-
ject, not a person. That object, the defendant's suitcase, had already
been seized on reasonable suspicion before it was subjected to the dog
sniff. The sniff of the suitcase is more closely related to dog sniffing of
parked automobiles and school lockers which were held not to be
searches in Horton, and were distinguished from the sniff of the stu-
dents' bodies by the Fifth Circuit. In Place, the dog sniff occurred out
of the defendant's presence and was completely unrelated to a sniff of
a person. Also important is that the situation in Place was not devoid
of all Fourth Amendment oversight: the Court determined that prior
to the sniff of the luggage authorities had reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify seizing the suitcase.
Schoolboards and officials are obligated to create a safe environ-
ment that is conducive to learning. The discovery of drug problems is
a significant step in achieving this goal, and school officials may act in
loco parentis to create such an environment.195 However, schoolchil-
193. See Martin R. Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on
Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 852 (1980) ("Full fourth
amendment scope would protect student privacy, be educationally sound, and re-
sult in no undue loss of security. Given the applicability of the fourth amend-
ment, the warrantless sniffing of the students by police dogs should constitute an
,unreasonable' fourth amendment 'search' on either of two theories. First, police
activity that casts suspicion directly upon citizens without cause is unconstitu-
tional. Second, the warrantless sniffing of persons by police dogs constitutes a
violation of protected privacy.").
194. See supra notes 59-114 and accompanying text.
195. See Erica Tina Helfer, Search and Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our Children's
Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 119, 120 (1979) ("Underlying all
the rules governing authority of teachers, administrators, and public school trust-
ees is the doctrine of in loco parentis. This doctrine authorizes the taking of 'any
action which is then reasonably necessary to carry out, or to prevent an interfer-
ence with, the educational function' by a teacher or other school personnel
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dren are not without Fourth Amendment rights; they have a protected
privacy interest in their persons and belongings while at school. That
privacy interest may be diminished so that random, suspicionless
drug testing may be allowed in certain limited contexts. However,
random, suspicionless intrusions in the absence of a legitimate crisis
situation, oblivious to the potentially traumatic effects upon students,
is not proper in loco parentis conduct. Such behavior is equivalent to
the worst possible parenting, creating an environment of hostility and
distrust between students and faculty where education and personal
privacy are sacrificed to the war on drugs. In loco parentis is a rela-
tionship meant to temporarily replace the family relationship; it
should not be interpreted to inoculate the school from its duty to act as
a reasonable parent.
Dog sniffing is not the benign, minimally intrusive act that most
people imagine. The dogs chosen for the task are not selected simply
because of their abilities to smell and be trained. Often German Shep-
herds and Doberman Pinschers are chosen because of their large size
and the frightening effect they have on people. In each of the cases
cited above, except for Plumas, the dogs made physical contact with
some or all of the children, sometimes more than just slightly. Even in
the Ninth Circuit case where no physical contact was reported, the
children were required to pass close to the dog.
There is additional humiliation possible for students who are the
subjects of false alerts from classmates who would not fully appreciate
the rate of false positives; that humiliation is potentially devastat-
ing.19 6 The humiliation is compounded when a child is singled out
after the dog alerts to that child. However, the case law demonstrates
that dogs falsely alerted because of the scent of another dog in heat,
against pupils." (footnotes omitted)); Margaret Beth Ditzler, Note, Dog Searches
in Schoolrooms-State or Private Action?, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 137, 144 (1980)
("The teacher derives authority from the ancient doctrine of in loco parentis,
whereby the parent impliedly delegates authority to the teacher. In acting to
discipline the student the teacher is merely operating as a parent, and does not
come under the prohibitions of the fourth amendment. Although in loco parentis
has been codified into public law in many states, theoretically any discipline used
by the teacher stems from the parent. As the parent is outside the arm of govern-
ment in the discipline of the child, so too should be the teacher." (footnotes
omitted)).
196. See Gardner, supra note 193, at 850-51 ("[T]here are reasons to regard intensive
smelling of people, even if done by dogs, as indecent and demeaning. By coming
into public, one may well assume the risk of happening to be smelled by other
people or animals in the ordinary course of social life, but it is difficult to believe
that one also assumes the risk of being intentionally and intensively smelled. It
is a source of justifiable annoyance and outrage when one's person is purposely
smelled without consent by another or by a dog acting upon the other's orders....
[H] aving one's person sniffed by a police dog in order to discover evidence consti-
tutes a violation of the right to be free from indecent intrusions and therefore
constitutes an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.").
[Vol. 85:735
CURBING THE DOG
perfume, and in one case for no discernible reason at all. The peer
ridicule that a child could face in a school setting because of a dog's
false alert should not be ignored.19 7
In addition to the humiliation, the fear generated by some of these
dogs should not be underestimated. A sizable percentage of people in
this country fear dogs because of intensely personal experiences and
historical abuses that are simply brushed aside in the name of law
enforcement. A frightening experience from childhood may cause a
person to fear dogs all his life. Furthermore, law enforcement has his-
torically abused the use of canines against African-Americans. From
the slave era when dogs were used to hunt down runaway slaves, to
the Civil Rights Era where police in the South turned snarling dogs
loose to control and disperse crowds gathered in peaceful protest, law
enforcement has used dogs to terrorize black communities.198 To ig-
nore this history by subjecting minority children to suspicionless dog
sniffing unnecessarily continues this painful tradition.
Exposing schoolchildren to random, suspicionless contact with
large dogs without examining the reasonableness of the school admin-
istration's decision is to ignore the Court's teaching in T.L.O. that
schoolchildren have Fourth Amendment rights. To protect children
from arbitrary dog raids such as that which occurred in Goose Creek,
South Carolina, dog sniffs should be moved back within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment to provide the proper judicial oversight for
such a potentially invasive and easily abused procedure.
VI. DOG SNIFFING OF MOTORISTS AND PEDESTRIANS
Although schoolchildren are most likely to be subject to a dog sniff
of their bodies, it is a growing practice for police officers to use canines
on motorists and pedestrians.19 9 Even more egregious than subject-
ing a motorist whose car has been lawfully stopped to a drug dog is
when a dog is directed randomly and without a prior lawful stop at a
pedestrian on the street. The motorist stopped for a traffic offense will
at least be able to mount a challenge to the stop of the vehicle and the
197. See Ditzler, supra note 195, at 149 ("While the need for a mass search within the
school environment may be greater than the need for one outside the school, the
emotional damage inflicted by a random search is extreme and may have un-
known effects on the children." (footnote omitted)).
198. See supra note 54.
199. Cf. State v. Wallace, 812 A.2d 291, 302 (Md. 2002) ("If the K-9 had sniffed respon-
dent, and specifically alerted to respondent, before the officer searched him, prob-
able cause for the search might have existed. If the officers simply had Bosco
sniff each of the passengers of the car prior to searching them, then probable
cause might have existed to search any of the passengers who positively re-
alerted the canine to contraband. This did not happen here."). "The growth of K-
9 units [has become] a 'fad' in many police departments." Wampler & Wampler,
supra note 54, at 381.
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seizure of its occupants, 20 0 where the same challenge is not available
to the random pedestrian. When a pedestrian is approached by a po-
lice officer with a drug dog, under the Place doctrine and the present
likelihood that the doctrine knows no limits, that person ordinarily
would not be able to challenge the police officer's decision to focus the
dog's attention on her person.
Prevailing Fourth Amendment standards, however, should suggest
that a pedestrian is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment at
the time she is approached by a drug dog.201 It is disingenuous to
suggest that a reasonable person would feel free to walk away and
disregard the officer and his dog; it is an interference with freedom of
movement that should rise to the level of a seizure. 20 2 In fact, if the
pedestrian attempts to avoid the officer and dog, her conduct will
likely precipitate further attention from the officer and enhance the
probability that an officer will stop her.20 3 Under these circum-
stances, the government should be required to justify the reasonable-
ness of the seizure. The special circumstances which exist at an
airport and which might justify random, suspicionless encounters of
this nature are usually absent when the encounter takes place on the
street. In the absence of articulated and established special needs, the
government should be required to demonstrate reasonable suspicion
of wrongdoing to justify the officer directing the dog at a person. 20 4
200. Cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) ("The Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and de-
taining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of those Amend-
ments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
quite brief."); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976).
201. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("We conclude that a
person is 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)
("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."); 3 LAFAVE,
supra note 92, § 5.1(a), at 4 ("[I]t is of great practical significance that the consti-
tutional test for determining whether a seizure occurred is expressed in objective
rather than subjective terms.").
202. For an alternative formulation of this rule, compare United States v. Kelly, 302
F.3d 291, 293 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Although a canine sniffofan object, as opposed
to a person, is normally not a search, this circuit has previously held that an up-
close canine sniff involving contact with a person's body is a search as defined in
the Fourth Amendment."), with United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.
2003) (non-contact dog sniff of person is not a search).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2004) (defendant
changed direction when he saw officer and drug dog; police followed).
204. See Max A. Hansen, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers
Come Down with a Case of Constitutional Nasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 410, 426 (1976) ("In most situations, the use of a drug detection dog should
be a search. This search should be unconstitutional unless there is some antece-
dent justification or an exception to the warrant requirement. Nevertheless
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Ordinarily, absent the necessary facts to arouse reasonable suspicion,
the seizure, a Terry stop, would be unreasonable. The dog sniff is the
fruit of that illegal stop.
In United States v. Williams,20 5 an officer observed a person in a
bus station presumably change directions when he saw the police en-
tering the station. Determined to talk with that person, the police
stopped Williams and directed their drug dog to sniff him. The drug
dog placed her nose in the vicinity of the suspect's waist and groin
area and then sat down, indicating the presence of drugs. The discov-
ery of the drugs and resulting prosecution depended upon the legality
of the dog's sniff and contact with the suspect. The solitary fact that
the suspect may have tried to avoid the police is not sufficient to estab-
lish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry seizure. Illinois v. Ward-
low established that flight alone is not enough to create reasonable
suspicion but is one factor that may be considered in the totality of the
circumstances. 20 6 In Williams there was no conduct that could be de-
scribed as "headlong flight;" there was only a man who sought to avoid
a police officer and his dog, for any number of reasons. Absent reason-
able suspicion to support the seizure, the encounter between the dog
and the suspect, if a seizure, violated the Fourth Amendment, and
every action that followed resulted from the illegal seizure. The Tenth
Circuit avoided that issue by finding no nexus between the dog alert
and all that followed, choosing instead to fall back on the right of po-
lice to approach persons in public and ask for information and cooper-
ation. The court saw no need to determine whether the presence of
the drug dog changes the nature of a law enforcement officer's ap-
proach of a citizen and request for information since, according to the
court, the dog sniff was not any additional incumbrance on the pedes-
trian.20 7 But of course, the introduction of the dog does change the
there will be some situations in which the use of a detector dog does not consti-
tute an illegal search despite the fact that there is no supporting warrant. These
situations involve circumstances in which it can be shown that the person did not
have an actual expectation of privacy, or that in light of society's demands, it was
not reasonable.").
205. 356 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2004).
206. 528 U.S. 119, 124-26 (2000). But see id. at 124 ("Headlong flight-wherever it
occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.").
207. Williams, 356 F.3d at 1273 ("In sum, at the time the officers made the decision to
request permission to search Mr. Williams's person, the fact that the dog had
alerted made little or no difference in that decision . . . ."). But see id. at 1276
(McKay, J., dissenting) ("When, as in this case, a drug dog shoves its nose in a
person's groin, and the person is told that the dog is searching for drugs, the
notion that an innocent person would not feel constrained-but free to leave un-
molested-strains my credulity. It seems to me that one would feel more re-
strained than if the officers had their guns drawn. Indeed, the frequent use of
police dogs rather than guns tends to confirm the collective police judgment about
the relative difference in intimidating effect. Add to that the real possibility that
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very nature of the encounter. The Williams court equivocated on its
responsibility to enunciate the relationship of the people and their
government in this critical forum involving the use of drug dogs on
persons.
Admittedly, labeling the encounter a seizure, as suggested here, is
merely an attempt to avoid the consequences of Place and its progeny.
Allowing a dog to sniff an inanimate vehicle without suspicion is cate-
gorically different than subjecting a person to a dog sniff of her body.
The intrusion of the suspect's person by the dog, while possibly mo-
mentary, is of such magnitude that it is ludicrous to suggest it is not a
search. It should be recognized for what it is, a search of the person,
and should be subjected to the reasonableness command of the Fourth
Amendment whether the subject of the dog sniff is a motorist who is
lawfully stopped or a pedestrian on a thoroughfare.
Any time a person is subjected to a dog sniff it actually is a search,
whether it is a schoolchild, a motorist, or a pedestrian. Developing a
legal fiction to permit dog sniffs to remain outside the protection of the
Fourth Amendment is a blatant attempt to provide law enforcement
with a tool that can be easily abused, all the while sacrificing common
sense. Whether a dog is sui generis or not, the dog is searching for
contraband. The object of the search should not insulate the govern-
ment from the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 20 8 The Court's
willingness to create categories of activities not subject to constitu-
tional protection is not only a departure from common sense but also
from traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The practice
threatens to render the Constitution virtually meaningless in defining
the line between individual autonomy and security and governmental
interference.
To extend United States v. Place to the person would be a throw-
back to the worst days of the war on drugs when curtailment of Fourth
Amendment precedents and guarantees appeared to be an acceptable
means in a losing war effort. Those courts that insist that a dog sniff
of the person is not a search disregard the physicality of the encounter
the presence of a few $20 bills in an innocent person's pocket could produce a
positive drug dog response, and I cannot but conclude that this encounter ma-
tured into a seizure before the defendant fled.").
208. See Arthur S. Brown, United States v. Place: Is There any Room in this Place for
a Sniffing Dog? A Look at this Place After Beale, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 141, 151-52
(1983) ("It is important that the courts recognize that a brief dog sniff investiga-
tion is a minimal intrusion and cannot be construed as a search. However it is
also crucial that the courts carefully consider what the narrow exceptions in the
Fourth Amendment are, so as not to expand law enforcement practice beyond
what is reasonable .... If courts are willing to protect society's compelling inter-
est in identifying those who traffic in illicit drugs for personal profit, they must be
willing to recognize that these interests are sufficiently substantial. The court
cannot view society's interest as being independent to the investigative process.")
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between man and drug dog and the fear such encounters are intended
to engender in their victims, 20 9 instead placing their faith in a flawed
technology prone to bite innocent people and alert at the scent of other
dogs in heat. It is not science fiction to suggest that any Supreme
Court decision that extends the Place doctrine to the person likely will
result in the widespread use of drug dogs not merely at the country's
borders or at airports but on the streets of many cities. 2 10 Such a rul-
ing would seriously mar the American people's belief that their Con-
stitution protects the security and privacy in their persons.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Place doctrine, exempting dog sniffs from all Fourth Amend-
ment requirements and standards, was built on a foundation of sand.
The underlying reasons offered for the doctrine, themselves totally un-
supported, turn out to be fictions. A dog sniff is not a minor intrusion
when applied to anything but an inanimate piece of luggage. Drug
dogs are not being used to distinguish between contraband and non-
contraband; drug dogs are being trained to signal the presence of alco-
hol and prescription drugs, neither of which is per se contraband, both
of which result in a potentially unwarranted search of the subject.
The accuracy rates of drug dogs vary tremendously, rendering broad
generalizations about near-perfect accuracy conceptually impossible.
Drug dog certification programs are seriously flawed as they are sel-
dom subject to outside oversight. False-alert rates are not generally
maintained and offered to courts to demonstrate accuracy, and false-
alert rates that are compiled are not compiled in double-blind tests-
the only way to assure fair testing.
These fictions should not be the basis for extending Place. Yet, in
the past two years, the Court has extended Place twice. First, the
Court approved suspicionless dog sniffs of cars for drugs.2 1 1 Then, in
a sleuth maneuver, the Court, without argument or opinion, summa-
209. Cf Williams, 356 F.3d at 1276 (McKay, J., dissenting) ("These drug dogs are not
lap dogs. They typically are large, and to many ordinary innocent people, fear-
some animals. For decades, the images of the Sixties civil rights' protests have
impressed on our collective awareness the image of similar dogs, with handlers
holding their leashes, viciously attacking innocent protesters. This public con-
sciousness is reinforced by reports of leashed dog attacks like the one involved in
the recent nationally-tracked conviction of a California lawyer whose leashed dog
killed her innocent neighbor in the hallway of their apartment building. Televi-
sion news reports of police dogs being used to subdue suspects are common.").
210. See Hirsch & Markus, supra note 6, at 48 ("Justice Souter describes the Court's
decision as an 'open-sesame' for general searches, allowing officers to make suspi-
cionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and pedestrians on
sidewalks. Officers could have dogs monitoring shopping malls, lengthy traffic
lights, and so on.").
211. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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rily reversed a lower court decision and seemingly extended Place to
homes. 2 12 The latter decision, which stands in complete contradiction
to the Court's affirmation of the importance of protecting privacy of
the home in Kyllo, was passed off without notice or discussion. The
limitation on Fourth Amendment rights embodied in Place is too im-
portant to be extended without extensive consideration. Drug dogs
have also been used on schoolchildren since before and after Place.
The use of drug dogs on persons, especially children, raises concerns
which should be forthrightly addressed. We have raised legitimate,
serious doubts about the reasoning which led to the Place doctrine.
Place should not be extended without reconsideration of the sui
generis nature of drug dog testing. Reconsideration of that reasoning
would not only make the Court hesitate to extend the doctrine to
homes and to persons, but should lead the Court to reconsider the
Place doctrine itself so that drug dog testing becomes recognized as a
search subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.
212. See Florida v. Rabb, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005). But see State v. Rabb (Rabb H), 920
So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 665 (2006).
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